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CANADIAN THESES ON MICROFICHE

THÈSES CANADIENNES SUR MICROFICHE

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TITLE OF THESIS/*TITRE DE LA THÈSE* CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY BEHAVIOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENT, 1963 - 1968

UNIVERSITY/*UNIVERSITÉ* University of ALBERTA

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/ *GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE* MASTERS OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/*ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ* 1974

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CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY BEHAVIOUR:
AN ANALYSIS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENT,
1963-1968

by

© Allan R. Gregg

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
FALL, 1974

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Canadian Parliamentary Party Behaviour: An Analysis of Minority Government, 1963-1968", submitted by Allan R. Gregg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The study that follows was undertaken in order to fill in what are believed to be gaps in the general body of knowledge on Canada politics. Minority parliaments appear to be occuring on a more frequent basis, yet writings on this topic have not increased in any accompanying fashion. Likewise our knowledge of party functionings in parliament is somewhat limited.

The thesis examines parliamentary party behavior in the 26th and 27th parliaments in an attempt to further our knowledge on the operation of minority government. Party cohesion, attendance, alliances and support for Government are examined through analysis of recorded divisions in the House of Commons Debates from May, 1963 to March 1968.

The stability of these parliaments is seen to be due to (1) Opposition support for Government in bloc or through individual cross-over votes and (2) insufficient membership turnout by the opposition parties upon crucial divisions. These specific findings are believed to be valid indicators of the operation of minority parliaments in general.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The initial idea for this project was inspired by Professor F. C. Engelmann during a graduate seminar course on Canadian political parties. The data based obtained and the general methodology used are attributable to his initial guidance.

Professor J. P. Meekison's critical assessments and readings of the intermediate stages of drafting were also much appreciated. I am especially grateful to Professor J. W. Lightbody for his constant supervision, understanding and guidance, without whose help the preparation of this thesis would have been impossible.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Marjorie, for her patient and persistent typing of numerous draft copies.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> When legislatures, as institutions are important in the operation of the political system, the behaviour of individuals (and political parties) who occupy roles within the legislature are politically significant and therefore become a subject of inquiry . . . important to political science.[1]

Of the last seven elections in Canada five have produced minority governments. Such situations may be attributed to various causes,[2] but regardless of the reasons we are now faced with a period where minority governments are as likely to be the rule as the exception. Despite the frequency of minority governments little is known about the effects on parties and parliamentary government that these situations produce. The study of political parties in parliament has focused almost exclusively on either majority situations or extra-parliamentary behaviour.

The study that follows was undertaken in order to examine the behaviour of political parties in the Canadian

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[1] L. F. Anderson, et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis (1964) p. 4.

[2] The strength of regionalism effecting voting and the single member electoral system exacerbating these cleavages has been singled out as failing to give Parliament a majority. For example, see A. C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System" in Canadian Journal of Political Science, I, 1, (March, 1968), 55-80; and J. Meisel, "The Stalled Omnibus: Canadian Parties in the 1960's" in Social Research, XXX, 3, (1963), 367-390.

House of Commons between 1963 and 1968. In general, the investigation looks at a parliamentary response, voting, while viewing executive policies as a political stimulus. The minority governments under Lester B. Pearson's Prime Ministership serve as the quantitative framework for the analysis. Whereas other studies have dealt with the productivity or worth of minority governments,[3] this undertaking examines the actual functioning of minority situations.

The purposes of this study are therefore two-fold. The first and most obvious will be to see whether contemporary theories of parties in parliament actually correspond to displayed parliamentary behaviour. Since the foundations of Canadian parliamentary party theory have been based on majority situations they may not hold true during minority government situations. The second purpose is to analyze a situation in which the ascribed roles of 'Government' and 'Opposition' are not always strictly defined. In other words, during minority governments the role of the Opposition in the House of Commons may be somewhat ambivalent. Because there is a plurality of parties holding the majority of seats in the legislature, it is necessary for an opposition party (or a part of its membership) to cast off, periodically, their role of opposing and support the executive. Without this periodic Opposition support, the incumbents would fall and minority governments would be an impossibility. It is therefore necessary to identify those behavioural traits displayed by parties in parliament which account for the longevity and success of minority governments.

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[3] For example see E. Forsey, "The Problems of 'Minority' Government", in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXX, 1, (February, 1964), 1-11; R. J. VanLoon and M. S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System (1970) pp. 454-456.

While two general concerns serve as the central focus of the discussion, ancillary problems will be raised, seriatum, under the various subheadings in this chapter.

1. The Sample Explained

The data base used to explore party behaviour in Parliament was obtained from the recorded divisions in the House of Commons Debates from May, 1963 to March, 1968. British precedent holds that divisions are officially recorded upon request from a parliamentary member voting in the minority, but Canadian practice has allowed divisions to be recorded after five or more members rise after the vote.[4] The total number of recorded divisions for this time span is 204.[5] This group will be considered briefly to present an overall view, both of voting members present and of the variety of legislation occurring during the Pearson years. The greater part of the study will be concerned with 113 divisions, 59 in the 26th parliament (1963-1965) and 54 in the 27th parliament (1966-1968).[6] These 113 divisions were isolated by removing (a) those divisions which were clearly procedural (i.e. to sustain the Speaker's decision and so forth) and as such could rarely affect the longevity of the Government;[7] and (b) those divisions dealing with minor pieces of legislation where the Liberals had a commanding majority of members present and voting upon division.[8] Since the study examines the tenuous position of minority government where party voting must depart from the strict role definition of 'Opposition-Government' in order to continue the life of parliament, the analysis of these 113 divisions (i.e. only those which could constitute a serious threat on the government's life) is the most expeditious method of exploring party behaviour under maximum stress. Under these divisions, party discipline is most crucial, hence maximum tact, care and strategy must go into party preparation for the vote. By using the divisions one can gain a better understanding of the most serious pressures and conflicts governing party behaviour in the House. The sample is therefore 'pure' in that it is not subject to survey error and is also selective in that only those divisions which are imperative to understanding the problem of party behaviour and minority government are used.[9]

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[4] See W. F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (1962) pp. 181-188 for discussion of the House dividing.

[5] For a listing and brief description of the total sample used, see Appendix I.

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[6] For a complete breakdown, by category, of those 113 divisions, see Appendix II.

[7] There may be marginal failures in this approach. A series of defeats on procedural items can technically constitute a governmental defeat. This phenomena, however, is extremely rare and cannot be found in our sample study.

[8] These minor pieces of legislation include: an increase in M.P.'s pay, investigation of maps and other amendments to minor pieces of legislation (for example: Farm Machinery Credit Bill). The criteria used for 'Liberal majority' in isolating these 113 divisions was five (5) sitting members. To be included under (b) in the text, the division must be of a minor nature and record five more sitting Liberal members than the number needed for a simple majority. For example, if 100 sitting members were present and voting upon division, there would have to be 55 Liberal members present before the division would be excluded from the survey. This arbitrarily established criteria presumes high continuous cohesion on the part of the Government. The study bears out this assumption.

2. Present Theories of Parliament Party Behaviour

Present theories of party behaviour in Canada's federal parliament are somewhat limited. Studies of legislative behaviour exist, but deal mainly with individual motivations for entering politics or demographic characteristics of legislators rather than with the actual behaviour of parties or men in the House.[10] The lack of empirical work on legislative behaviour has resulted in a limited body of knowledge with respect to parties in parliament. The disjoint theories that are available have largely been based either on the extra-legislative behaviour of parties in Canada, or on legislative behaviour in other political systems. The studies of the Canadian party system and of voting behaviour in general elections have produced considerable information about our political system but the knowledge gained from these studies does not necessarily explain or account for the actual performance of parties in parliament. At the same time, studies of parliament have concentrated more on executive-legislative relationships or the structural aspects of parliamentary government. Thus a gap in our general body of knowledge about parties in parliament has evolved. Having been extrapolated largely from an extra-legislative situation and then transferred to the parliamentary level, party theories that are available are subject to many interpretations. The following is a brief survey of the literature on the party system that has been used to explain party behaviour.

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[9] Note that in the future for studies of this nature the inclusion of minor or procedural motions may be to the researcher's benefit. These divisions can be used to test the mood of the House and in many instances are couched in such terms as could easily lead to a vote of non-confidence. The Opposition blocking a motion for adjournment or continually questioning the confidence of the Chairman of the Whole are good examples of this 'mood testing' motion. This legislative tactic was rarely used (and when used, unsuccessful) during the Pearson years.

[10] For example see A. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour (1967); N. Ward, The Canadian House of Commons; 2nd edition, (1963); and N. Ward and D. Hoffman, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons (1970). Although these works vary in their approach, they are the major texts on what has been termed 'legislative behaviour'.

A) Party Discipline as a Determinant of Party Behaviour

Kornberg states that ". . . legislatures are organizations and not merely agglomerations of individuals".[11] This theme appears throughout most of the Canadian and European literature on parties and the party system, but is probably best explained by R. Michels:

---

[11] A. Kornberg, op. cit., p. 2.

> The relationship between different organizations (i.e. political parties) demands a certain degree of personal and tactical continuity, for without such continuity the political organization would be impaired.[12]

What both authors are emphasizing is that the concept of the whole is greater than the component parts. Individual motivations, inclinations and responsibilities are subordinated to the caucus or leader's interests. More simply, party discipline plays an integral part in the functioning of parliaments and is a critical variable in understanding voting behaviour in the legislature.

Escott M. Reid has documented the changes within the traditional parties in the Canadian parliament during the late nineteenth century.[13] Over this period, the emergence of the party discipline necessary to sustain a parliamentary ministry was to mean the gradual disappearance of unaffiliated members and the formalization in Canada of the parliamentary party roles of 'Government' and 'Opposition'. Concurrent with this process was the formal emergence of Canada's major cadre parties, the Liberals and Conservatives.

The practice of 'party' ruling individual behaviour is even more necessary today if parliament is to be run efficiently. The growing amount of government business,[14] the strengthening of the Executive,[15] the sanctions available to the Prime Minister[16] and centrally financed election campaigns[17] have all been pinpointed as instrumental in promoting backbench subservience.

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[12] R. Michels, Political Parties (1915) p. 103.

[13] E. M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada", in H. Thorburn ed., Party Politics in Canada; 2nd edition, (1967) pp. 15-22.

The emphasis attributed to party discipline and its effect on legislative behavior results from the notion that the operation of parliamentary government necessitates cohesion and attendance by a party's membership. Government must govern and therefore must have the attendance necessary to pass legislation. Similarly the Opposition, as a viable alternative to the Government, must be seen to possess the capacity to defeat or sanction the executive. The concept of party discipline transferred into practice assumes that party members stand together on issues and that these stands are determined by ideology, commitment, expediency or electoral responsibility.[18]

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[14] For example see R. G. Robertson, "The Canadian Parliament and Cabinet in Face of Modern Demands", in Canadian Public Administration, XI, 3 (Fall, 1968), pp. 272-289.

[15] For example see T. Hockin ed., Apex of Power (1971) and R. Blair, "What Happens to Parliament?", in T. Lloyd and J. McLeod eds., Agenda: 1970, (1968) pp. 217-240.

[16] For example see T. Hockin, "The Prime Minister and Political Leadership: An Introduction to Some Restraints and Imperatives", in T. Hockin ed., op. cit., pp. 2-21.

[17] For example see K. Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (1970) pp. 4-9, 97-109.

[18] See A. Kornberg, op. cit., pp. 129-140; A. Kornberg "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties", in American Political Science Review, LX, 1, (March, 1966), pp. 83-93 and N. Ward and D. Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 65-66, 161-166 for a discussion on the forces which bind members to party caucus decisions.

However, the common denominator governing all these factors which may determine individual voting is thought to be party membership.[19] Because of the dictates required by the role of 'government party' and 'opposition party' other interests have been seen to be subordinated within parliament to the interests of the individual's respective party.

This emphasis on party membership ruling all parliamentary party behaviour accounts for the paucity of literature in Canada on the topic under study. The assumption has been made that, regardless of circumstances, a member will vote entirely on the basis of party lines and, in turn, that the party will vote entirely on the basis of its role in parliament (i.e. either Government or Opposition). However, forces within the political system act against such absolute party cohesion.

Constituency pressure and regional representations are obligations no parliamentarian can overlook and still maintain a political career. A member's personal perception of the role he plays in parliament can alter his behaviour.[20] Issues which members must face are not necessarily coincident with election issues or party promises and are therefore not prone to constant party unanimity. The point to be made here is simply that the parliamentary process is often not so clearly defined as to make divisions on party lines a simple matter.

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[19] See R. J. VanLoon and M. S. Whittington, op. cit., pp. 449-452; F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (1967) pp. 115, 184-185; R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), The Government of Canada; 4th edition (1966), pp. 223-225; J. A. Corry and J. E. Hodgetts, Democratic Government and Politics; 3rd edition (1959) pp. 195-198.

[20] See A. Kornberg, op. cit., pp. 105-118; N. Ward and D. Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 139-149.

Party discipline in the Canadian House of Commons is one of the areas of investigation in the following chapter. It is submitted that the argument intimating that there is a blanket causal relationship between party discipline and legislative behaviour is not wholly fallacious, but rather fails to account for such phenomena as cross-over voting or Opposition support for Government--two factors which are instrumental in understanding the functioning of minority government.

B) The Role of Parties in Parliament as a Determinant of Party Behaviour

The notion that votes will be constantly determined by the role a party plays in parliament is also open to contention. Traditional assessment of parliamentary government cited political 'ins' and 'outs' as the causal variable determining votes.[21] Under this simple delineation legislative voting was relatively predictable; 'ins' were for the ministers, 'outs' were against them. This classical notion has permeated much of the present day literature.

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[21] For example see W. Bagehot and R. Crossman ed., The English Constitution; revised, (1963) and Sir I. Jennings, Cabinet Government; 3rd edition, (1961).

In order for parliament to function, the Government must govern and the Opposition must act in the traditional opposing capacity, by criticizing, auditing and acting as 'the grand inquest of the nation'.[22] Voting is therefore thought to be based on this functional delineation. However, it is painfully apparent that this cannot be the case in a minority government situation. If parties behaved on this Government-Opposition criteria, the Government would fall provided the Opposition maintained sufficient parliamentary attendance. The break down of 'Government-Opposition' roles in minority government has not been adequately explained. However, on the basis of the available literature, it is possible to predict why and when these role functions break down.

C) Omnibus and Minor Parties in Parliament

It would seem that during minority government situations the traditional parliamentary roles will break down among the opposition parties rather than within the Government. Periodic Opposition support for the Government will occur because although the parties share the 'Opposition' role, not all of them perceive their purpose in parliament as being the same as their counterparts'. Therefore not all opposition parties necessarily have to behave in the traditional capacity of opposing Government. The Progressives in 1921 provide an excellent example of such a situation.[23] Although gaining 64 seats in the twelfth parliament, the caucus was determined to vote on the basis of their conscience rather than on the prescribed role of "Official Opposition' to which their parliamentary representation entitled them.

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[22] See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), op. cit., pp. 400-417; J. A. Corry and J. E. Hodgetts, op. cit., pp. 327-344 and R. J. VanLoon and M. S. Whittington, op. cit., pp. 458-463.

The Progressive tradition has, in part, carried over into the orientations of third parties today. These minor parties are, by and large, considered to be parties of conscience. Historically, minor parties have arisen in order to fulfill regional or ideological needs in the Canadian political community which were not being met by the traditional parties and their consensual outlook of the political world.[24] Third parties, rather than being success-oriented, should therefore tend to be issue oriented (i.e. they have commitments to either ideology or regions) in their legislative behaviour. It would seem therefore that minor or third parties would be much more likely to support the Government on these issues than would the Official Opposition.

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[23] See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (1950), pp. 96-128.

[24] The rise of third parties in Canada has been attributed to various factors. G. Horowitz, in "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation", in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXll, 2 (May, 1966), pp. 144-171 has attributed the success of socialism in Canada to the presence of a 'tory touch' found in the political culture. C. B. MacPherson, in Democracy in Alberta (1953), attributes the growth of the Social Credit Party in the West to the reaction to a 'quasi-colonial economy'. On the other hand, M. Pinard in The Rise of the Third Parties (1971) states that the Social Credit in the East evolved as a protest against mounting urbanization and industrialization. He then goes on to point out the similarity between Social Credit and Conservative support in Quebec. The important point is that all three authors point out that third parties arose as a reaction to either an ideological or a regional need.

The traditional parties should behave differently. The Liberals and Conservatives are believed to behave on the basis of parliamentary dictates.[25] The Official Opposition will criticize and vote against the Government in order to enhance their electoral advantage and, in turn, replace it. However, this brokerage-particularistic model of Canadian parties also fails to explain parliamentary behaviour under minority situations fully. Under which situations will minor parties give Government support? How does a third party, instrumental in the formation of Government alliances, compromise between its ideological and regional commitments and the necessity of continuing the life of the Government? Conversely, will major or omnibus parties join together to ward off minor party motions that threaten their 'national' party image?[26] Most importantly, will the differences in electoral orientations among the opposition parties inhibit the formation of a united opposition and thereby account for the success of the Government?

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[25] See F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 51-52, 226-236.

[26] J. Porter in The Vertical Mosaic (1965) pp. 368-377 points out that the traditional parties' preoccupation with national unity issues has restricted and affected their other policy orientations. Such a preoccupation should also affect the major parties' legislative behaviour.

These questions will be raised in the following chapters. If there is no correlation between electoral orientations and party voting behaviour and all parties act in opposition, occasionally giving governmental support in a random fashion, then the notion that this brokerage-particularistic breakdown is a salient factor in directing party behaviour at the legislative level must be seriously questioned. On the other hand, if third parties continuously vote their conscience regardless of the Government's stand (that is, there is a correlation) then the notion that electoral orientations do shape parliamentary behaviour can be upheld. If there is a partial correlation such that third parties appear to vote their conscience and still support the Government, then it may be argued that the Government party catered to and (to some extent) legislated for these parties in exchange for their support.

D) Parties in the Political Environment

The final aspect of party theory that has been transferred into legislative theory deals with the party's role in the political environment. Theoretically, parties are the political aggregators of interest, articulating interests from the electorate into the formal political process of parliament and its machinery.[27] These

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[27] See F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 9-21; M. Duverger, Political Parties (1951), pp. 392-421.

"grand connectors" are therefore thought to be responsive to the specific regions to which they owe their electoral support. At the same time the individual member owes his seat to his constituency.[28] Coupled with these electoral and individual pressures is a need, within omnibus parties, to appear as 'national parties'. All these cross-pressures will circumscribe the way in which a caucus will behave in their formal parliamentary role. As mentioned, these cross-pressures may be different for the various parties and as such could cause these parties to behave in different ways. The role of 'interest articulator' is therefore subject to many cross-pressures which can direct party behaviour and make a party's overall role either more ambivalent or explicit.

The theories of the role of political parties in parliament that have been examined appear as a number of disjoint ideas rather than an integrated theory. The role a party is forced to play in parliament (Government or Opposition), the role of a party adopts due to electoral inclinations (omnibus or particularistic) and the general role of parties as interest aggregators, have been cited and used to explain behaviour that 'should' result on the basis of these role functions. This study aims to examine which of these roles are salient in affecting legislative behaviour and which intervening variables operationalize these roles in determining party behaviour.

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[28] See R. J. VanLoon and M. S. Whittington, op. cit., pp. 463-464; P. Fox, "Our MP's--Their Role and Need" in P. Fox ed., Politics: Canada; 3rd edition (1970), pp. 388-391; A. Cairns, op. cit., for a discussion on the pressures on the M.P. and caucus.

3. Minority Government and the Investigative Areas of the Study

Eugene Forsey has stated emphatically that there is no problem with minority government.[29] Canada has experienced minority governments, federally, under five different Prime Ministers.[30] The 'watchsprings' of the nation did not stop. In fact, during the years with which this study is concerned the Liberal minority government was able to pass a phenomenal bulk of both controversial and reform legislation. Included in this impressive legislative record were such items as a new Canadian flag, redistribution of constituency boundaries, the creation of the Science Council, the Economic Council of Canada and the Company of Young Canadians, liberalization of divorce laws, the Canada Pension Plan, new parliamentary and committee regulations, the re-organization of governmental departments and over twenty other major pieces of legislation. Judging by this the problem of minority government does not lie in its legislative output. Why use, as a case study, a situation that has no explicit problems?

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[29] E. Forsey, op. cit., pp. 1-11.

[30] The first of the governments was under MacKenzie King and oscillated between minority and majority status from December, 1921 to June, 1926. Arthur Meighen led the next from June to September, 1926. John Diefenbaker controlled two minority governments from June, 1957 to March, 1958 and again from June, 1962 to April, 1963. Lester Pearson led the next minority situation from April, 1963 to July, 1968. Since the November, 1972 election, we have been faced with the fifth (and ongoing) minority government led by Pierre Trudeau. Note that the early governments under John A. MacDonald and Alexander MacKenzie are not included in this brief resume' due to the difficulty of actually determining who the political 'ins' and 'outs' were.

The answer to this question is that while minority government is not inherently a problem, its occurrence reveals problems to the Canadian social scientist. One major problem with minority government is simply that not enough is known about its operation. Minority governments have been viewed as a temporary annoyance that will disappear once the electorate correctly makes up its mind. But since it appears that minority governments are becoming a common occurrence in Canadian politics the study of party behaviour in such parliaments should buttress our knowledge of Canadian parties and politics at a time when this understanding is critical.

The investigative areas established for this study parallel the gaps in our knowledge of parliamentary party behaviour and the nature of minority governments. Two major areas have been designated for investigation: 1) party discipline, and 2) party alliances in the House of Commons. Before commenting on these areas some discussion of the methodology used in the study is necessary.

Unfortunately, the preponderance of work done in the field of legislative (voting) behaviour is based on individual behaviour in the United States and Britain.[31] These studies have largely been based on random techniques which take little account of the affect of party discipline on legislative behaviour. This study shall therefore deviate from traditional empirical assumption and state that 'party' is the independent variable acting upon legislative behaviour. The hypothesis is that there is a causal relationship between parliamentary party discipline (i.e. cohesion and absenteeism) and party affiliation. Variables such as 'issues' and 'support for government' will serve as a control in order to examine alternative explanations for variations on the dependent variable. The test hypothesis then will be that party behaviour will be cohesive (100 per cent) and that control variables will affect this party cohesion. This technique enables us to test the rationale under-lying minority government operation and to expose those factors which affect party behaviour.

A) Party Discipline

A major factor in the functioning of minority government and in turn advancing one's understanding of party behaviour is parliamentary attendance. This variable, while being integrally related to party discipline, has been ignored by many researchers in Canada, possibly because it seems too obvious and fundamentally simplistic.[32] Yet numbers dictate that if House voting attendance averaged 100 and a minority government controlled a plurality of 51 seats and maintained full attendance, the governing party would not require opposition alliances in order to maintain legislative power. This situation, however, presumes that there is no concerted effort on the part of the Opposition to defeat the Government. Opposition attendance and voting would have to be such as to enable the Government to continue governing without additional parliamentary support.

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[31] Probably the best known of these pioneering works are: S. Rice, Quantitative Methods of Politics (1928) and A. L. Lowell, The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America (1903). Some modern works in the same field include: D. MacRae, Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting (1970) and S. Patterson et al., Comparative Legislative Behaviour (1972).

The second aspect of party discipline that will be examined is party cohesion (i.e. caucus members binding into a cohesive legislative voting bloc). Epstein declares that,

> . . . Canada's parties cannot be as weakly organized as the American because both the Liberals and Conservatives (or more simply, a potential governing party) must be cohesive enough to support a parliamentary government.[33]

He goes on to point out that ". . . the demands of the parliamentary system do not make parties more pragmatic, but only cohesive".[34] There is little doubt that the parliamentary system, cabinet government, the element of 'party' and the monopolization of expertise by the executive, all promote backbencher subservience and rigid party discipline with the result being high internal party cohesion. But it is also apparent that the tenure of minority governments is somewhat dubious, that parties have internal conflict and that issues have an emotional impact on parliamentarians. These elements and their effect on parliamentary behaviour (and especially cohesion) have not been adequately explored by Canadian social scientists. It shall be contended that while party cohesion is usually high, under certain circumstances it will break down. This breakdown can be measured by the frequency of crossover votes (i.e. the number of members voting against the majority of their party on any given issue). Cross-overs which support the Government, while not as important as alliances and formal Opposition support for the Government, may play an important part in the maintenance of minority government.

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[32] None of the major texts dealing with the operation of the Canadian legislature (see supra note 10) have dealt empirically with the element of absenteeism in the House.

[33] L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (1967) p. 283.

[34] Ibid.

B) Alliances

It has been impossible, to this point, to discuss party behaviour and minority government without mentioning parliamentary alliances. Dawson states that:

> The party system and particularly the party system under cabinet government, will find the best conditions for its operation where there are two parties, or at least two parties sufficiently large to provide, as a rule, a clear majority in the legislature.[35]

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[35] R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), op. cit., p. 454.

Indeed, a parliamentary system containing only two parties would probably be the easiest and most efficiently run; one party governs and the other opposes. But the rise of third parties in Canada has added a new dimension to the operation of legislative bodies. While never being in a position to govern, these third parties have on occasion and now more frequently, been able to secure enough seats in the House of Commons to threaten the safely entrenched position of the party forming the Government. As a result, the governing party must be aware of regional or ideological pressures exerted by these third parties. This brokerage theory of legislative behaviour argues that the Government must therefore be able to adapt their policies in order to appease these varying factions.

In a minority situation where opposition support is sometimes necessary to pass legislation alliances become increasingly important. It will therefore be maintained that in Canada alliances will be the most important factor in continuing the life of a minority parliament. As such, alliances should be the dominant behavioural trait displayed in minority situations.[36]

Notwithstanding this hypothesis, it is clear that

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[36] Note that 'alliances' have been used instead of 'coalitions'. This results from the belief that these alliances are not formal or binding. Rather, opposition alliances will be formed with Government periodically, depending on the situation. However, as will be shown, these alliances can be lasting and occur with a degree of regularity.

neither discipline nor alliances will consistently operate as the sole factor in sustaining the Government. By viewing the regularity and the basis on which the respective parties supported the Government it can be determined when alliances became imperative in maintaining the Government's power. Alliances will be measured in terms of (a) lasting legislative blocs voting for or against Government and (b) temporary support of Government depending on issue content.

The procedure required in order to develop an adequate understanding of this legislative behaviour from 1963-1968 would be as follows:

1) establish (on the basis of attendance and absenteeism) if alliances were needed;
2) if they were needed, if they existed;
3) on what basis and under what circumstances alliances did exist;
4) in what manner these parliamentary alliances operated with reference to the different opposition party orientations (i.e., conscience or consensus), and to issue content.

The element of party cohesion and cross-over voting should also play a role in parliamentary behaviour and the Government's ability to enhance its governmental position. Crossing-over will be examined:

1) by issue
2) by support or opposition to Government

In summary, the main thesis of the study is that minority governments are not unstable. This can be argued on the basis of two major hypotheses: (1) the Government, in a minority situation, can continually rely on Opposition support in bloc or through cross-overs whenever the life of parliament is threatened, and (2) when the Opposition acts as a united body their attendance is such that they cannot defeat the Government.

4. The Historical Context of the Study

How does this parliamentary party and behaviour theory relate to the Pearson years and why were the Pearson years selected for this study rather than another minority government situation?

We know, through considerable journalistic writing, that the Pearson regime was extremely controversial both in and out of parliament.[37] The Social Credit Party was racked with dissent between French and English elements in the party. R. Thompson and R. Caouette, for example, contradicted each other continually as to the party's stance on the nuclear acquisition question during 1963. Social Credit's inability to find common ground for electoral and parliamentary strategy resulted in a party split along ethnic lines on

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[37] Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive work done on this era is P. C. Newman's, Distemper of Our Times (1968). Another interesting treatment of the entire Pearson-Diefenbaker conflict is P. Nicholson's, Vision and Indecision (1968).

September 2nd of that year. The Progressive Conservatives had to cope with a leadership problem as well. The 'Dump Dief' campaign by party president Dalton Camp and prominent Conservative lieutenants was the result of this leadership dilemma. Internal dissent in the Liberal caucus was also prevalent during such contentious issues as the flag and capital punishment debates. The expulsion of Ralph Cowan from the Liberal caucus is evidence of the intensity of this conflict. The Pearson years were also marked by public scandal, resulting in a conflict of party leaders and parliamentary procedures that brought to the fore the weakness and vulnerability of the Liberal Government.[38]

Here again we find a paradox that is in no way explained by the available literature. Liberal democratic practice presumes that political elites are removed by 'the will of the masses', but in actuality this process is slow and for various reasons leaders enjoy a high degree of independence. The same presumption can be extended to the case at hand. This means that in a minority situation it could be presumed that the governing party can be removed by the will of a united opposition. On the basis of this criteria, the Liberal government under Lester B. Pearson, between 1963 and 1968, becomes increasingly interesting.

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[38] These scandals came to the fore between November, 1964 and June, 1965. The most notable of these events included the exposure of the Munsinger Affair, the Rivard Case and the Spencer Case.

The Liberal government's weakness and apparent confusion invited defeat, yet they were able to ward off non-confidence motions,[39] retain control of parliament in light of defeats,[40] and pass an abundance of controversial legislation.

After both elections, in 1963 and 1965, the NDP and the Social Credit (and Creditistes) held the balance of legislative power whereby their votes (either with or against the Tories) could have decided the fate of the Liberal government. After the 1963 election, Robert Thompson, then leader of the Social Credit Party stated:

> We would take a responsible attitude and support the Liberals for at least a time, while we see what they can do. Under the leadership of Pearson and their front-benchers who we know, I don't think that they would produce what the country needs. We would have to defeat them after a time.[41]

The New Democratic Party, on the other hand, was much more ambivalent in their readiness to denounce the Liberals. Although the NDP was adamantly opposed to certain

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[39] The Liberals were faced with two unparalleled non-confidence motions within the first three months of power: May 21, 1963 (nuclear arms question) and June 24, 1963 (Budget). They were able to muster enough votes on both occasions to survive the motions.

[40] On February 19, 1968, the Liberal government was defeated on the third reading of a major tax bill, but parliament was not dissolved. Nine days later they brought the vote to the House again (as a vote of confidence) and sustained the motion 139 to 119.

[41] As quoted by P. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 267.

Liberal propositions during the 26th parliament,[42] as late as 1965 T. C. Douglas was quoted as saying (of the Conservatives) that his party had no intention of

> . . . being manoeuvered into helping those transparently seeking to keep parliament in a continual state of ferment at a time when there is so much work to be done.[43]

It could be said, therefore, that the NDP, while not willing to compromise their ideological stance for government support, were more anti-Conservative than pro-Liberal. Moreover, there was no love between John Diefenbaker and the Liberal Party. Their defeat and Pearson's resignation would have been invited by Diefenbaker at any time. It appears, therefore, that the opposition parties were, at many times willing to unseat the government in power.

It is within this historical context that the question of minority government and party behaviour is investigated. The Liberals needed but few votes on any given issue to maintain their reign, but no opposition party was outwardly willing to voice its support for the Government. Although the composition of the House was so close to being a majority that for legislative purposes it could almost be termed such, the Liberals campaigned in 1965 on the need for a majority government. Regardless of the Liberal's near legislative majority they and the opposition parties, viewed these parliaments as a period of minority government and behaved accordingly. It was apparent that the Government wished to consolidate its position, even though its position did not appear tenuous. The period is filled with incongruities and paradoxes. The study in the following chapters will hopefully enhance our knowledge of minority government and clear up some of the paradoxes surrounding the Pearson years.

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[42] The NDP was especially against the Liberal policy towards nuclear arms acquisition. In fact, on the non-confidence motions during the nuclear arms question, the NDP was instrumental in the attempt to unseat the Liberals by either siding with the Conservatives or moving their own amendments.

[43] As quoted by P. C. Newman, op. cit., p. 124.

CHAPTER II

PARTY DISCIPLINE AND STRATEGY

The purpose of this chapter is to identify salient behavioral traits in the House of Commons between 1963 and 1968. Two areas of investigation have been established: party discipline and party strategy. These aspects of parliamentary party behaviour have been chosen in light of the theoretical tenets established in the previous chapter. Discipline is necessary in order to prompt party attendance in the House and to bind members into a cohesive voting bloc. Strategy is the telling factor in consolidating the legislative advantage of parliamentary parties. Both these aspects of party behaviour will therefore be examined in order to explain governmental power in minority situations. Table 1 shows the distribution of legislative seats held by the various political parties during the two Pearson parliaments.[1]

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[1] By-elections, deaths and retirement caused slight fluctuations in the composition of the House (mostly in the form of vacancies). However, these do not alter the statistical significance of the tests that have been run. Therefore, the statistics used in Table 1 will be used throughout the study. Also, it must be noted that although the Social Credit Party split in September, 1963 this investigation has studied the party's behaviour as one. This approach is substantiated in the text when discussing Social Credit cohesion. Note however that the party split in the house was Social Credit, eleven; Creditistes, thirteen for the 26th Parliament and Social Credit, five; Creditistes, nine for the 27th parliament.

Table 1

Distribution of Legislative Seats by Party, 26th and 27th Parliament

Political Party	26th Parliament	27th Parliament
Liberal	129	131
Conservative	95	97
NDP	17	21
Social Credit	24	14
Other	0	2
Total	265	265

In both parliaments the combined opposition held a (numerical) potential for unseating the government. However, the number of seats the Liberals required in both parliaments to change their plurality to a majority was slight. It is within this scenario that the behaviour of these political parties will be investigated.

1. Party Discipline

Party discipline is important in two senses. Firstly, discipline must be exerted by the party in order to encourage attendance when particular policies divide the House. Attendance (and its converse, absenteesim) will be measured by viewing the number of party members present and voting upon divisions. Secondly, discipline is further necessary to bind the party's members into a cohesive legislative bloc. The two aspects of party discipline pertinent to this investigation can therefore be loosely defined as: (A) members present and voting; (B) cohesion.

(A) Party Members Present and Voting (Attendance)

Table 2 depicts aggregate attendance for the recorded divisions in the 26th and 27th parliaments.[2] 'Average attendance' represents the mean number of members present and voting per division in the study sample; 'percentage attending' indicates the average percentage of the party present and voting.

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[2] Note that both Table 2 and 3 show attendance for the original 204 divisions as described in Appendix I.

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Table 2

Members Present and Voting, 26th and 27th Parliament

Political Party	26th Parliament		27th Parliament		Average 1963-1968	
	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending
Liberal	98.4	76.3%	89.9	68.6%	94.3	72.5%
Conservative	65.3	68.8	62.8	64.7	64.1	66.8
NDP	12.0	70.8	14.5	69.1	13.2	69.6
Social Credit	16.2	67.4	8.7	61.9	12.2	64.5
Total	191.9	72.5	175.9	66.4	184.8	69.7

n=204

Table 3, on the other hand, contrasts the actual percentage of the House controlled by each party (i.e. legislative seats held) to the average percentage of voting members present by party. This table reveals the legislative advantage parties maintained notwithstanding that allocated them by the electorate.

Both these tables reveal an important factor in the maintenance of minority rule during 1963 to 1968. On the surface it appears that the Liberals, although receiving a minority of seats in both elections, were able to maintain a majority by virtue of their superior parliamentary attendance. In fact, only the Liberals showed an increase in voting attendance over their actual percentage of parliamentary seats. It would seem then that the Government's aggregate attendance was higher than the other parties for both sittings, and therefore they were able to control a majority of voting members.

But it must be remembered that the figures in Tables 2 and 3 are merely averages. As such they are but aggregate indicators and, by definition, are subject to fluctuation. Although the Liberals controlled an overall majority of voting members, there are intervening factors present in the 'parliamentary game' that can either strengthen or weaken a party's legislative position. A lack of cohesion in the Liberal party could easily nullify the Government's advantage in attendance, whereas Opposition party support could

Table 3

House Composition and Actual Voting, by Percent

Political Party	26th Parliament House Composition	26th Parliament Actual Voting	27th Parliament House Composition	27th Parliament Actual Voting	Average 1963-1968 House Composition	Average 1963-1968 Actual Voting
Liberal	48.7%	51.2%	49.8%	51.1%	49.2%	51.2%
Conservative	39.9	34.0	36.9	35.7	36.4	34.8
NDP	6.4	6.3	8.0	8.3	7.2	7.2
Social Credit	9.1	8.4	5.3	4.9	7.2	6.8
Total	100.1*	99.9*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

n=204

* Does not equal 100.0% due to rounding error

enhance the Liberal's parliamentary position. These areas, however imperative, will be explored below.

It is important first to view the fluctuation in parliamentary attendance. Figure 1 shows party voting over the time period for which the study is concerned. While it cannot be argued conclusively that an impending election drastically affects absenteeism, it can be noted that the interim periods between elections show the lowest rate of parliamentary attendance. Probably more important, in terms of interpreting Figure 1, is the revelation that there were, in fact, sustained periods when Liberal attendance fell below that of the opposition parties. It was also found that during the second half of 1963 and the year of 1967, the potential for Liberal defeat was greatest. During these periods, the Government's attendance was such as to leave them with a minority status. While it still may be stated that Liberal overall voting attendance was superior to that of the other parties, this was not consistently the case. Intervening variables apparently do affect party attendance and thus discipline.

Van Loon and Whittington believe that intra-party discipline is maintained ". . . by various sanctions and inducements".[3] While these sanctions and inducements cannot be overtly or empirically derived from the sample, they are

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[3] R. J. Van Loon and M. S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System (1971), p. 449.

Figure 1

Party Voting, by Six Month Interval, 26th and 27th Parliaments



NOTE--The periods represent average participation for 6 month intervals. 1965 and 1968 both have only one six month period due to the shortness of those sessions.

undoubtedly included in those 'intervening factors' that affect parliamentary attendance. The promise of cabinet seats or parliamentary assistantships coupled with the threat of dissolution and an ensuing election are potent devices available to the Prime Minister which can be used as a method of whipping both Opposition and Government backbenchers 'into line'.[4] Although these powers cannot be measured from the sample, their effect may be apparent in party behaviour displayed in parliament. These available sanctions are largely available only to the 'government'. It would seem therefore that 'governing status' and the sanctions accruing from that status could, in part, explain the Liberal's superior attendance.

As argued in Chapter 1, this study deals mainly with those 113 divisions (as outlined in Appendix II) that most affected the life and workings of parliament. By collapsing these 113 divisions into twelve 'issue' categories their impact upon party behaviour can be explained.[5] Various issues, because of their emotional impact, substantive content or innate importance in maintaining governmental control should affect the elements of party discipline, attendance and cohesion. As such, the actual substantive content of issues can be identified as those measurable intervening variables that affect party behaviour. These issues are categorized below as follows:

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[4] For Example See T. Hockin, "The Prime Minister and Political Leadership: An Introduction to Some Restraints and Imperatives", in T. Hockin ed., Apex of Power (1971) pp. 2-21.

[5] The nature of the debate surrounding these divisions was used in order to categorize the issues. The fact that there are twelve categories is due to nothing more than the belief that the nature of the divisions lent themselves to this form of typology.

A) GOVERNMENT MONEY BILLS: This issue area includes those motions (n=12) which dealt with fiscal matters (such as the Budget and Income Tax Act) moved exclusively by the Government.

B) ADDRESS IN REPLY: These issues include motions (n=9) by any of the Opposition parties in reply to the Speech from the Throne.

C) FREE VOTES: These issues are usually considered moral questions and members are openly allowed to break party lines. In other words, due to the substantive content of the motion, the House feels that members should be allowed to vote by their conscience rather than by party dictates. For example, Capital punishment, and the Flag debate (n=10).

D) REGIONAL QUESTIONS: These issues are usually initiated by Opposition members in an attempt to represent their region or constituency. They deal exclusively with 'the West', 'the East', 'Quebec' and so forth (n=4).

E) NON-CONFIDENCE OR CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT: This issue area includes those motions that are intended to embarrass the Government's record or members. Also included are formal motions of both non-confidence or confidence in the Government (n=12).

F) NATIONALISM: These issues include the flag debate and the question of the unification of armed forces. They deal with national unity and emotional feelings towards the country (n=14).

G) IDEOLOGY: These issues presume an ideological decision must be taken on the basis of the motion's content. For example, Medicare (as a question of socialized medicine), Nuclear acquisition (as a question of aggression versus pacifism) (n=12).

H) WELFARE: These issues include the pension plan, old age securities and so forth. While this category is closely related to 'Ideology', it does, nevertheless deal exclusively with welfare policies (n=7).

J) MONETARY AMENDMENTS: This issue area includes those Opposition motions (n=14) dealing with major and supplementary fiscal matters brought up by the Opposition during the Budget or as amendments to Government money bills. Note that many of these motions could constitute a vote of confidence, but none are formal motions as such.

K) QUESTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMY: This category consists of motions (n=5) brought up during the question period dealing with the state of the national economy. As such, none were presented in bill form.

L) FEDERALISM: These issues deal with votes on federal-provincial jurisdictions or suggestions to transfer authority from one level of government to another (n=3).

M) OTHER: These include motions (n=12) on rules, Senate retirement and general questions of diminished political salience. This category is therefore basically residual.

This is the basic typology as established for the remainder of the issue tables in the study and will be used for the length of this investigation.[6]

Table 4, like Figure 1, indicates a fluctuation in voting attendance given the intervening variable of issue content. The table also reveals an important point in

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[6] Some of these categories will later be classified as major (see Table 17). Because not all categories can be cited as being of a major nature, certain criteria was established to isolate some divisions from others. Those votes which could have theoretically brought down the Government are of the utmost importance. These include 'Non-Confidence' and 'Government Money Bills'. 'Address in Reply' was included in the major divisions because they follow the throne speech which introduces Government legislation for the upcoming session. Medicare and the Pension Plan were included because of the great deal of spending involved. The Flag debate was included because of its emotional impact. Monetary Amendment were finally included due to the fact that only a Government Minister can introduce a money bill. Therefore a defeat on any of the above motions would have caused the Government great embarrassment and could have likely led to a want of confidence motion.

Table 4

Party Members Present and Voting by Issue

Political Party	Government Money Bills (n=12) Average Attendance (Seats)	Percentage Attendance	Address in Reply (n=9) Average Attendance (Seats)	Percentage Attendance	Free Votes (n=10) Average Attendance (Seats)	Percentage Attendance	Regional Questions (n=4) Average Attendance (Seats)	Percentage Attendance
Liberal	96.6	74.3%	113.0	87.6%	91.6	69.9%	109.8	85.1%
Conservative	64.1	67.6	77.4	81.5	77.1	80.3	79.8	84.0
NDP	13.6	71.3	14.6	85.9	15.2	72.4	13.8	80.9
Social Credit	11.9	62.7	15.8	65.0	10.3	73.6	20.8	86.7
Total	184.2	70.6	220.6	83.2	194.2	73.3	224.2	84.6
	n=12		n=9		n=10		n=4	
	Non-confidence (n=12		Nationalism (n=14)		Ideological (n=11)		Other (n=12)	
Liberal	111.0	84.6%	105.0	80.8%	105.4	81.1%	83.6	64.3%
Conservative	79.2	82.5	68.1	70.9	68.8	71.6	52.6	54.8
NDP	14.4	75.8	13.5	75.0	18.3	91.7	13.2	69.3
Social Credit	15.9	83.7	17.6	80.2	13.4	79.1	11.7	58.7
Total	220.5	83.2	204.2	77.1	207.9	78.5	161.1	60.8
	n=12		n=14		n=11		n=12	
	Welfare (n=7)		Monetary Amendments (n=14)		National Economy (n=5)		Federalism (n=3)	
Liberal	91.0	70.0%	98.0	75.4%	104.6	80.5%	105.7	81.3%
Conservative	58.5	60.9	65.4	68.1	75.4	78.5	76.7	79.9
NDP	14.2	74.3	15.5	81.0	13.4	74.4	12.7	70.4
Social Credit	10.7	56.2	12.9	67.9	13.0	61.9	15.7	71.3
Total	174.4	65.8	191.8	72.4	206.4	77.9	210.1	79.3
	n=7		n=14		n=5		n=3	

party orientations and general parliamentary attitudes towards different issue areas. Some striking observations can be seen immediately upon inspection of Table 4.

Only on two of these issue categories could the Government have been defeated on the basis of its attendance record. These include the 'Free Vote' and 'Regional Question' areas, both of which in no way threatened the Government's longevity. In other words, the Opposition would have little ground to consider these issue areas a want of confidence if they were able to defeat the Liberals when these questions arose.

Overall voting patterns fit nicely into the classical notion of parliamentary importance. More simply, the voting patterns reveal that those issues which are of major national importance or have the most impact on the life of parliament tend to call forth the highest number of members. It is interesting to note however, that there are marked deviations to these generalizations. Attendance on Government money bills is remarkably low when one considers their importance both to parliament and the nation. As indicated by the low turnout, monetary amendments likewise draw little parliamentary attention. Attendance for the Address in Reply issue area is second highest which may be attributed both to the importance of these votes and to the fact that these motions come early in the parliamentary session when many members have just arrived in Ottawa. Non-confidence motions also precipitate large turnouts, while the 'Other' and 'Welfare' categories show the lowest priority for parliamentary attendance.

The Liberal Party, as the Government Party, had the highest voting percentage in the majority of issue areas. It can also be noted that the issues for which the Liberals maintained a most commanding majority, 'Money Bills' and 'Non-Confidence', are those in which the Government should be most logically concerned. On the other hand, for those areas which do little to effect the tenure of parliament, 'Free Vote' and the 'Other' categories, the Liberals displayed their lowest turnout. This finding reinforces the tentative hypothesis that the governing party, in minority situations, will maintain a superior voting turnout, only in those areas of direct consequence to its existence.

Progressive Conservative voting attendance, like their overall House turnout, is quite low on all the issues. Their voting turnout, in relation to the other parties, seems to reveal a relative disinterest in 'National', 'Ideological' or 'Other' questions and more surprisingly, 'Government Money Bills' and 'Monetary Amendments'. These results run opposite to the traditional assumption that the Official Opposition is to be instrumental in both defeating and auditing the Government on questions of national importance. Rather than confront the Government on either the Opposition's or Liberal's major motions, the Conservatives deflected their interests (as personified through their attendance) into areas of lesser parliamentary consequence. The data presented, thus far, cannot explain this behaviour, but this point will be brought up again and discussed at a later time.

New Democratic Party voting shows marked fluctuation, in their attendance by issue. They scored highest of all parties on 'Ideological', 'Welfare', 'Other' and 'Monetary Amendment' categories. Quite surprisingly, their lowest participation in relation to the rest of the House was on questions of 'Non-Confidence' or 'Condemnation of Government'. While this behaviour seems similar to the Conservative Party's (in that the NDP show little interest and therefore inclination to defeat the Liberals) it is not parallel. While the NDP did not seem to want to confront the Government formally (by defeat through non-confidence) they were, nevertheless interested in major Opposition motions and those issue areas which they identified as being coincident with their electoral and ideological orientations.

The Social Credit Party showed their highest (relative) turnout on regional issues and the question of nationalism. Their overall attendance was generally low but on certain issues ('National Economy', 'Monetary Amendments' and 'Government Money Bills') their attendance drops even below that average. Although the Social Credit Party, like the NDP, held a balance of power in parliament their behaviour seems to reveal a general disinterest with the formal business of the House.

Underlying the categorization of divisions by issue area was the hypothesis that issues would (besides affecting attendance), reveal parliamentary and party interests, which would in turn produce evidence of party orientations and priorities. In other words, it was presumed that party voting attendance indicates parliamentary interest: if the party elite feels a certain issue area is important to that party's legislative position, then discipline will be exerted upon the membership and voting attendance will reflect that discipline. As such, these interests can be seen as a function of parliamentary party priority setting.

The parliamentary game itself produces some of these priorities. The ascribed roles of 'Government' and 'Opposition' should define certain stances while the very nature of running parliament should produce interest in those issues that could potentially terminate that parliament's existence. The governing party must be interested in their own legislation. Opposition must be interested in those motions which have been defined as theirs through the legislative process. Their respective attendance in the House, therefore, ought to reflect these interests. But the actual behaviour displayed does not bear out these tenets totally. Motions on 'Government Money Bills' show relatively low parliamentary turnout (even for the Liberals) while, at the same time, the Official Opposition did not display marked interest in those very motions that they are to spearhead: monetary amendments. The behaviour that 'should' result, in light of present party theory, is not consistently displayed. It must be concluded, therefore, that an external factor other than the party's ascribed role in parliament must effect behaviour under certain circumstances.

Table 4 adds further credence to this contention in that it appears that different parties perceive themselves as having different roles and interests in parliament. The voting behaviour as reflected in this table therefore reveals different party orientations. The NDP, true to their image as a party of conscience, showed its highest interest on ideological and welfare questions. The Social Credit Party, reflecting their sectional basis, showed a greater interest in regional questions. It appears that for some parties the image they project electorally is carried over into parliamentary interests. It also seems that the prerequisites of 'governing' demands certain behaviour that will allow for the retention of that status.

But other findings do not square with our expectations of parliamentary party orientations. The opposition parties do not seem to share a sufficient or common concern to defeat the Government. Certainly this is revealed by their varying interests and attendance within the confines of any one issue area. The Conservatives, and Social Credit show low turnout on those motions which are considered joint Opposition motions ('Monetary Amendments'), while the NDP's response is relatively high. On the other hand, the NDP show comparatively little interest on questions that could theoretically defeat the Liberals (Non-Confidence). It becomes apparent that not all the queries raised by Table 4 can be explained by the data presented thus far. However, the evidence available in this table seems to indicate that the Opposition parties did not show collective interest in defeating the Government. This stems from contention that the parties perceived themselves as having differing roles in parliament. That is, the role of 'Opposition', for the two minor parties, was overarched by their political orientations. Nevertheless, the Liberals seemed to be aware of some form of imminent threat because they fortified their attendance for those issues that could have threatened their tenure. Conservative voting behaviour is much more difficult to explain. Their attendance was not as high as would be expected if they were seriously offering an alternative to the Government through the defeat of the Liberals. Why this was so cannot yet be explained at this point in the thesis.

(B) Party Cohesion

Like attendance, cohesion is an integral measure of party discipline. But unlike attendance which is an indicator of the interest displayed in the system or parts thereof, party cohesion measures internal likeness or affinity. Hence, if a party shows high turnout it is interested in that aspect of the parliamentary process for which that participation is relevant, be it acting in Opposition or as Government or interest in a certain issue area. But if a party is cohesive it is displaying an internal affinity with an ideology, principle, stance or role in parliament. Cohesion therefore measures the membership satisfaction with the general party dictates and the strength of those dictates.

This study assumes party cohesion to be a fact of life in Canadian parliaments--members will form a cohesive legislative bloc and vote together on issues. This study, rather than investigating the presence of cohesion per se, will explore the more exceptional condition of cross-over voting. As mentioned, the Liberals only needed a few votes in a few situations to achieve an actual working majority. Therefore, cross-over voting becomes instrumental in understanding the maintenance of minority rule. This aspect of parliamentary behaviour is also important in attesting to the conditions under which party dissent manifests itself in the House. The measurement of cross-over voting will be achieved by viewing the number of times members broke lines in order to vote against their party's stance. Here, a vote is considered a cross-over when a member either votes against the majority of his fellow party colleagues or, in the case of an even split, when members vote against their party leader.

The first column of Table 5 shows the raw frequency of party cross-overs per division from 1963 to 1968. Because this column is presented in raw frequencies, it means that the Liberals had an average .62 members voting against the party on every recorded division. This does not mean that the NDP had the lowest indice of cross-over voting. When frequency is controlled for the numerical strength of the

Table 5

Frequency and Percentage of Cross-over Voting, by Party

Political Party	Frequency Per Division	Percentage of Party
Liberal	.62	.48%
Conservative	1.71	1.78
NDP	.49	2.58
Social Credit	1.91	10.05
Total	4.73	1.78

n=113

different parties in parliament, the percentage of cross-over voting in the right-hand column is attained. The percentages gives us a better view of internal dissent in each party.

It is apparent that the Liberals had the highest overall cohesion, while the Social Credit party displayed a great deal of intra-party differences. The low incidence of cohesion among Social Credit members could, at first glance, be attributed to the Social Credit, Creditistes split. However, it was found that conflict in the Social Credit ranks did not manifest itself in voting behaviour along this party split.[7] Rather at one moment or issue, Social Credit members would vote together as a party and at other times it seemed that individual members were simply voting their own conscience. This low level of cross-over voting by the Liberals would enhance their parliamentary position vis-a-vis concerted Opposition attack and thus improve their ability to ward off defeat. Similarly, Opposition's lesser ability to remain cohesive underpinned their inability to defeat the Liberals, and at the same time provided the Government with additional (fragmented) support.

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[7] In the pre-test it was found that all Social Credit-Creditiste members voted as a cohesive party 34.3% (n=70) of the time. Members voted along the party split only 20.1% (n=41) of the time. The remainder of the divisions (n=93) showed Social Credit-Creditistes members breaking party lines in no particular fashion (45.6%). However, in this last category 16.2% (n=33) of the total voting displayed a one-man cross-over away from the party. The high incidence of bloc voting is strong evidence that on many occasions the Social Credit and Creditistes may well have met as a single caucus.

The percentage of cross-over voting gives some insight into the amount or lack of cohesion in each party. However, in order to investigate the maintenance of minority rule it is more expeditious to view the frequency of crossing-over displayed by each party. It is these individual party member's cross-overs rather than the aggregated percentages that are imperative in understanding where and when the Liberals received the additional votes they needed to carry their mandate. Table 6 shows the total frequency of members breaking party lines per issue area. When crossing over 'to' the Government is indicated, the majority of the designated party must be in Opposition; that is, voting against the Government. On the other hand, when there are cross-overs 'away from' the Government, the majority of the party indicated must be in support of the Liberals. In every issue category except nationalism and questions of national economy, the preponderance of cross-over votes goes to support the Government. This direction of cross-over voting would make sense in that Opposition parties are, in theory, supposed to oppose Government action. Therefore, the majority of cross-over votes going to support the Government reflects the fact that Opposition party members are more frequently voting against the Liberals. The aspects of voting for or against the Government will be delved into more deeply in the section under 'Support'.

While Table 6 repeats the overall findings that the NDP had the least frequency of cross-over voting and that the

Table 6

Total Frequencies of Cross-over Votes by Party and by Issue

Political Party	Government Money Bills			Address in Reply			Free Vote			Regional Question		
	Votes to Support Government	Votes to Oppose Government	Total Cross Overs	Votes to Support Government	Votes to Oppose Government	Total Cross Overs	Votes to Support Government	Votes to Oppose Government	Total Cross Overs	Votes to Support Government	Votes to Oppose Government	Total Cross Overs
Liberal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	60	0	0	0
Conservative	0	0	0	4	12	16	95	12	107	2	2	4
NDP	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	8	8	5	2	7
Social Credit	18	4	22	19	1	20	13	4	17	9	0	9
Total	18	4	22	28	13	41	104	84	188	16	4	20
	n=12			n=9			n=10			n=4		
	Non-confidence			Nationalism			Ideological			Other		
Liberal	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	1	1	0	0	0
Conservative	2	0	2	8	6	14	4	11	15	6	9	15
NDP	7	0	7	8	12	20	1	2	3	0	4	4
Social Credit	31	5	36	7	17	24	18	3	21	14	1	15
Total	40	5	45	23	41	74	23	17	40	20	14	34
	n=12			n=14			n=11			n=12		
	Welfare			Monetary Amendments			National Economy			Federalism		
Liberal	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0
Conservative	1	6	7	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	1
NDP	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	0
Social Credit	20	0	20	24	5	29	3	6	9	11	0	11
Total	21	6	27	27	6	33	4	10	14	12	0	12
	n=7			n=14			n=5			n=3		

Social Credit Party had the highest, there are fluctuations in this overall voting pattern. As expected, 'Free Vote' issues have the highest incidence of cross-over voting. While these votes are not usually seen to be indicative of the degree of cohesion present upon division, free votes may still provide a valid indicator of party affinity. It is under these issues that members are allowed to break party lines and vote their conscience. Therefore by viewing those issues under which party discipline is removed, free votes can be used as an additional measurement of party likeness, or the degree to which party members share the same values.

The free votes reveal that on these issues the Liberals and Conservatives are their least cohesive, while the two minor parties display a comparative lack of crossing-over. The Liberals had 60 cross-over votes for these ten divisions, but it must be remembered that 50 of these came in the first free vote (Death Penalty question) of the 27th parliament. A comparatively low incidence of cross-over voting on the subsequent free votes would therefore indicate either that the Liberal party members are quite cohesive on their ideological or moral stances or that party discipline was still being exerted even though the vote was declared and considered 'free'. There is no conclusive evidence on this point, although the latter conjecture is more likely to be the case.

On the other hand, the Conservative's behaviour shows that there is marked differences on their member's stands when 'the whips were off'. The breakdown of cohesion upon free votes likely indicates that the party outwardly allowed members to vote their conscience. It would seem therefore, that the comparative behaviour of Conservatives and Liberals on free votes would indicate that these two consensus parties behaved differently under the same 'issue' condition. The Liberals see the demands of governing overriding 'moral' decision making, while the Conservatives do not feel obligated to retain a rigid party status and confront the Government on 'free' votes.

This point is further evident in that, overall, the Conservatives do act in a cohesive capacity: by their voting record they are quite a cohesive party. Their cohesion is maintained on a relatively steady basis and only breaks down under certain issues. On 'Government Money Bills', 'Address in Reply', 'Non-Confidence' and 'Monetary Amendments' their cohesion is high. This phenomena is almost diametrically opposed to their attendance, which is low for these same divisions. This behaviour would indicate that the Conservatives who were in attendance for these major bills were cohesive within the parameters of their party's dictates and therefore fulfilling their defined Opposition role. Their cohesion breaks down on the 'Ideological', 'Nationalism' and 'Other' questions. The Conservatives also show poor attendance for these divisions. However, these issue areas were probably seen by the party as being of lesser import and therefore their low attendance is reflective of disinterest. At the same time, their high incidence of crossing over in these issues seem indicative of party conflict. It would appear therefore that Conservative cohesion on strictly governmental functions or major issue areas is high, but that their overall discipline shows that there was internal conflict in the party during this period. However, this party conflict only manifested itself in the Conservative's legislative behaviour upon issues of minor consequence.

Conflict becomes apparent on those issues where the Conservative's stand is not clearly defined within the parliamentary game or their party platform: ideological, nationalism and other motions. It would seem then that when the rigors of acting in Opposition were less necessary in the House, the Conservative's behaviour and cohesion becomes more erratic. This contention will be raised again and tested in later correlations.

The NDP show low cross-over voting on almost all issue areas. The slight exception to this trend seems to be those divisions concerned with questions of nationalism. In this issue area, the majority of the cross-overs were against the Government, since the party leadership was voting with the Liberals. It might be contended, therefore, that NDP cohesion broke down on these questions of nationalism because the leadership stance on these issues ran against the ideological commitment of some of its more radical members. Overall, however, the party's attendance and lack of cross-over voting indicates that the NDP were both well-disciplined and internally alike.

The Social Credit Party, on the other hand, displayed high cross-over voting on almost all issues. This party, in fact, accounts for most of the cross-over voting the 26th and 27th parliaments. Three major points can be brought out about the party's voting behaviour. Cross-over voting is: (1) extremely high, overall, (2) generally supporting the Government (i.e. when the majority of the party opposed the Government their cohesion was lowest) and (3) compared to their overall performance, extremely low on 'Regional', 'Other' and 'Free' votes. These trends are indicative of low party affinity but high cohesion on regional and moral questions. Members, therefore seem to have little allegiance to the party itself, but do nevertheless have similar views on specific issues. This behaviour buttresses the contention that the Social Credit-Creditistes have little commitment to their party but rather view their parliamentary role as representatives of constituent and regional interests.[8]

The Liberals, throughout the period, maintained stringent party discipline. In fact, aside from one free vote, crossing-over was exhibited only sixteen times in the 113 divisions, most of which could be attributed to

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[8] See D. Murray, "The Ralliement des Creditistes in Parliament" in Journal of Canadian Studies, VIII (May, 1973) 13-30 for a further explanation of party member's personal attitudes towards their role in parliament.

Ralph Cowan during the last half of 1964. It appears that, through their attendance and cohesion, their discipline was such that they were able to muster enough votes on a majority of issues areas to maintain their governing status.

Some major trends can be seen through the presentation of Table 6. Firstly, it must be noted that party cohesion exists and under most circumstances is extremely high. Secondly, it can be stated that of the crossing-over that was exhibited, a large majority went to support the Government. Lastly, it will be tentatively hypothesized that some of those votes which went to the Government were on major issues and that they were therefore, in part, responsible for the Government maintenance of power.

The examination of party discipline reveals insights into the individual party's behaviour and attitude toward their role and position in parliament. The Liberals seem very aware of the necessity of running the Government. Their high participation and cohesion on major issue areas seems to demonstrate that they were aware of potential defeat if they were to allow discipline to waver. The Conservatives, on the other hand, showed somewhat less interest in religiously adhering to their official capacity of Opposition. When they were cohesive their attendance was such as to render them ineffective. The NDP acted as a well disciplined party. However, its voting record indicates marked interest in specific legislative areas rather than interest in a general Opposition capacity. The Social Credit

Party also seem oriented, only more so, to specific interests. Their general interest and party affinity was low for the overall legislative period.

2. Party Strategy

Without a doubt, attendance and cohesion are essential to party strategy. This can clearly be seen in the increased parliamentary attendance and party cohesion upon the major issue areas. There seems to be a direct relation between this disciplinary improvement and those areas which most directly affect the life of parliament. For those issues which could constitute a potential defeat of the Government there is a marked improvement in discipline. It is also known that most of parliamentary party strategy and bargaining is done outside the walls of the House.[9] While we cannot conclusively attest to the amount of political strategy each party undertook, the emergence of this bargaining can be seen in certain cases through the actual legislative behaviour of individuals and parties. Bargaining and communication between the parties can cause cross-party support for each other's motions. The strategy of finding and reaching an agreement with an opposition parliamentary member can result in legislative pairing. These two aspects of party tact will therefore serve as the investigative devices for this subsection.

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[9] For example see P. Fox, "Politics and Parties in Canada", in P. Fox ed., Politics: Canada; 3rd edition (1970) pp. 223-227; F. C. Engelmann and S. I. Pobihushchy, "Party Integration in Canada", in O. Kruhlak et al. eds., The Canadian Political Process (1970) pp. 180-197; R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), The Government of Canada, 4th edition (1966), pp. 455-463.

(A) Cross-Party Attendance

The section presented on discipline hinted that the ascribed 'role' that a party takes on within the parliamentary game is an important consideration in affecting that party's voting attendance. Indeed, if we are to rely on the parliamentary theory that is available, where Opposition parties are supposed to oppose and in doing so offer a viable alternative to the Government, they must be in a numerical position to threaten the Government--they must be able to wield the potential sanction of defeat. If they are not willing to defeat the Government, the Opposition must still be able to 'audit' executive decision-making and thereby use their grand inquest function and in doing so insure the populace of the non-use of arbitrary power. Both functions require parliamentary turnout and the power and sanctions that accrue from that attendance. Through this collectively ascribed role of 'Opposition' these parties are, in theory, natural allies. But it was also pointed out in the section on discipline that many times when the Opposition should have opposed (i.e. those major issue areas when the Government could have been defeated) their attendance was such that they were incapable of wielding the sanction of potential defeat. In understanding the workings of minority governments it therefore becomes important to see if the Opposition parties were able to communicate across ranks and thereby conscript support from their 'natural allies'. By viewing party attendance upon the various opposition party's motions it can be seen if the party moving the question was able to gain support (through turnout) from the other parties. If attendance is a manifestation of parliamentary interest, as has been contended, then this correlation should enable us to see how interested or involved the opposition parties were in each other's motions.

Table 7 shows attendance when controlled for opposition party motions. In all situations presented the opposition parties were able to muster more attendance for their own individual motions than any other. But it is also seen that this is the only time that their turnout is high. When one opposition party made a motion, the other parties made little effort to support these motions (through their attendance) and in turn, threaten or defeat the Liberals. As a result, the Government was able to maintain a clear majority in all areas. If it is held that this form of strategic participation (that is, accentuated attendance upon fellow Opposition motions) is a function of the involvement a party has in 'the game' or the interest a party has in acting in joint Opposition, then it seems conclusive that there was no concerted effort by the opposition parties to unseat the Government. The three parties under investigation seemed to be aware of strategy

Table 7

Members Present and Voting, by Party, upon Opposition Motions

Political Party	Conservative Motions n=44		NDP Motions n=21		Social Credit Motions n=11	
	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending
Liberal	105.6	81.9%	100.5	77.3%	103.7	80.4%
Conservative	73.6	77.5	65.9	68.7	73.2	77.0
NDP	12.1	71.3	16.4	91.3	13.3	73.7
Social Credit	17.2	71.7	14.0	70.0	17.4	82.7
Total	208.5	78.6	196.8	74.3	197.6	74.5

n=113

through attendance when they are individually in the spotlight or integrally tied into the parliamentary process but when their counterparts attempt to advance specific legislation, the remainder of the Opposition falls back into a pattern of (what we shall tentatively call) disinterest. It appears that Opposition attempts at making a showing of strength in parliament is merely a symbolic act. These parties support their own motions by making a token attempt at fulfilling their legislative role of pressuring the government, but share no mutual involvement with other opposition parties.

In light of what has been said about the previous table on Opposition motions, Table 8 is extremely interesting. The Liberal party, in direct contrast to the others, displayed their lowest turnout on their own motions. In fact, both the Conservative and Social Credit attendance is also lowest upon Liberal motions. Only the NDP's voting behaviour deviates slightly from this pattern. It appears therefore, that the Liberals were most concerned with Opposition motions, while the other parties were solely interested in their own motions. Since it must be believed that the Liberals wanted their motions passed and since their attendance upon these motions was so low, it would appear that the Government was able to gauge clearly the possibilities of defeat and to order their attendance in such a manner as to ward off that defeat. Their exhibited attendance would also indicate that the Liberals felt quite secure that

Table 8

Members Present and Voting, by Party,

upon Government Motions

Political Party	Average Attendance	Percentage Attending
Liberal	93.8	72.2%
Conservative	63.2	65[illegible]
NDP	15.4	76.8
Social Credit	10.9	64.1
Total	183.3	69.8

n=37

their own motions would not be defeated and that they were quite capable of defeating Opposition motions.[10] In summation, it can be stated the parties investigated had different strategies about their participation when they made motions. It appears that the Opposition did not see itself as a unified body, but rather as three distinct units. This basic difference in voting behaviour will be delved into further, at a later point, by viewing the direction of party votes upon each party's motions.

(B) Pairing

The empirical measurement of party strategy is, at the best of times, very difficult. The division sample provides us with no measuring rod upon which to test parliamentary tact. As a result, there are few means available to gauge the strategy developed in caucus. The divisions recorded in the House of Commons Debates do, however, frequently provide us with written statements of those members paired. Pairs are arranged prior to voting and result in an abstention. This means that if a member knows that he will not be able to attend and, in turn, vote on a certain day or issue, he can arrange a pair with a member from an opposing party.[11] As a result the paired member will not vote when the House divides. Therefore, it is to the legislative advantage of a party to have absent members arrange a pair in order to nullify opposition voting. Pairing for the 26th and 27th parliaments is presented in Table 9.

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[10] It must again be noted that a Liberal motion was defeated on Feburary 19, 1968. However, evidence would indicate that this defeat was a parliamentary miscalculation. It was defeated on the third reading after the bill had been read and approved in principle. In other words, the bill had already passed in the House twice.

The table shows that the NDP and Social Credit members were not as frequently paired as the two major parties. This may be largely attributed to these parties' lesser numerical status in parliament, and to the fact that it is more desirable for the Government to pair with the Official Opposition. The Liberals were paired to a slightly lesser degree than the Conservatives. Also it can be seen that the few times that the minor parties were paired, they abstained for the benefit of absent Liberal members. This minor party pairing seems logical due to the fact that third parties are also supposed to act in opposition so that there should be no need for the NDP or Social Credit members to pair with the Conservatives. But in a minority situation, where opposition parties sometimes side with the Government, these additional pairs can become exceedingly important. It appears then, that the Liberals gained a slight legislative advantage by arranging more pairs upon division than

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[11] See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised) op. cit., pp. 386-387; W. F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (1962), pp. 185-190 for a further discussion on pairing in the House of Commons.

Table 9

Number of Recorded Pairs, by Party, for the 26th and 27th Parliament

Political Party	26th Parliament	27th Parliament	Total
Liberal	65	51	116
Conservative	53	72	125
NDP	3	10	13
Social Credit	11	1	12
Total	132	134	266

n=113

the combined Opposition. By viewing pairing by issue area a better understanding of how the Liberals used that marginal advantage can be seen.

Table 10 reveals Liberal strategy quite pointedly. Not only were the Liberals able to arrange more pairs overall, but they were able to arrange them in such a manner as to pair less frequently upon major Government and Opposition motions, and at the same time were able to reciprocate their obligation to pair for the opposition members upon less important motions. The Liberals arranged their legislative pairing in such a manner as to allow their own members to be absent on those occasions where there was little chance that their governing status would be jeopardized. In other words, when issues arose that did little to affect the Government's tenure, the Liberals were able to pair almost twice as many opposition members as they were obligated to. In short, by pairing almost twice as many opposition members the Liberals were able to allow the same number of their rank to be absent from the House while in no way threatening their legislative advantage. Only on "Free', 'Ideological', 'Welfare' and 'Other' votes was the Government outpaired and thus had a surplus of members in the House that were unable to vote. These issues are basically of little parliamentary consequence and correspond quite closely with areas of low Opposition attendance. It can be concluded, therefore, that the Liberals were both more conscientious and successful than

Table 10

Frequency of Party Pairing, by Issue Area

Issue Area	Political Party				
	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Social Credit	Total
Government Money Bill (n=12)	7	20	3	0	30
Address in Reply (n=9)	7	6	0	5	18
Free Vote (n=10)	13	5	0	2	18
Regional Question (n=4)	6	4	0	2	12
Non-confidence (n=12)	13	26	3	4	46
Nationalism (n=12)	10	14	1	1	26
Ideological (n=11)	18	9	0	0	27
Other (n=12)	23	16	0	0	39
Welfare (n=7)	7	5	0	0	12
Monetary Ammendment (n=14)	8	8	2	0	18
National Economy (n=5)	3	8	3	0	14
Federalism (n=3)	1	4	1	0	6
Total	116	125	13	12	226

n=113

the other parties in those areas of parliamentary strategy that are prone to measurement.

The findings thus far have not really allowed for many sweeping or even conclusive statements. The investigation of party discipline and strategy however, has revealed two dominant behavioural traits for the years under study: (1) the Liberals maintained superior parliamentary discipline and strategy to that of the other parties and (2) the Social Credit Party had a high incidence of cross-over voting going toward the Liberal Party. Both these aspects of parliamentary behaviour were therefore instrumental in maintaining the tenure of the Government. However, it was shown that the aggregate attendance and cohesion of the Liberals was subject to fluctuation. Also, fragmented individual support in the form of cross-over votes likewise fluctuates and as such is not very dependable. It is therefore necessary to investigate other behaviour in order to explain the longevity of minority government.

CHAPTER III

ALLIANCES, SUPPORT AND THE CRUCIAL DIVISIONS

The data presented in Chapter II allowed for observations on both general party orientations to the parliamentary game and the comments on the success of the Liberal Government from 1963 to 1968. However, the previous findings only allow for the partial explanation of the operation of minority governments. In order to complete the analysis two basic areas of investigation have been established: (1) interparty alliances and Opposition support for Government and (2) party behaviour upon the most crucial divisions.

1. Alliances

Liberal attendance and Social Credit cohesion have been pinpointed as determinate factors in continuing the life of parliament. However, Opposition party support, in bloc, is also seen as being essential in enabling the Government to pass legislation and ward off defeat. Table 11 shows the frequency of overall support for the Government and reveals that party discipline is not the sole reason for the Opposition's failure to take advantage of its slight majority and defeat the Liberals. The table shows that the Opposition parties did give, in many cases, outright support to the Liberals. Both the NDP and Social Credit Party

Table 11

Opposition Party Support for Government, 1963-1968

Political Party	Support		Opposition	
	Frequency	Percent*	Frequency	Percent
Conservative	25	22%	88	78%
NDP	56**	50	55	50
Social Credit	58	52	55	48
Total	139	41	198	59

N = 113

* All percents have been rounded to the nearest whole

** NDP total does not equal 113 due to two party abstentions supported the Government on just more than half of the total divisions in which they voted. In fact, even the Conservatives threw their support behind the Government on almost one-quarter of the divisions indicated.

By examining support for the Government further a better picture can be drawn of the conditions under which legislative alliances were created. Table 12 shows the formation of alliances for the 26th and 27th parliaments. The table reveals that NDP-Social Credit alliances were both the most frequent and mostly created to support the Government. The table also points out that the Government did not usually gain support from a single party but rather from a combination of parties. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the Opposition united to confront the Government on only twenty-six (or less than one-quarter) of the occasions in question. For an Opposition that is supposed to consistently oppose the Government, this is an extremely low incidence of alliance formation. It appears that the Conservative Party had a difficult time forming alliances with the two minor parties and especially with the Social Credit. This evidence would also partially reject any notion that the formation of minor party alliances are difficult due to ideological differences in the face of brokerage policies. It seems, in fact, that the two minor parties, on many occasions perceived their interests as being quite similar. On the other hand, the Conservatives were more

Table 12

Legislative Alliances For and Against the Government

Alliances	NDP-PC	NDP-SC	PC-SC	PC-SC-NDP	Total
In Opposition	10.6%	27.4	3.5	3.5	45.1
In Support	16.8	6.2	8.9	23.0	54.9
Total	27.4	33.6	12.4	26.6	100.0

n = 113

frequently isolated from the NDP and Social Credit Party.

A) Support

The study, thus far, has presumed that votes are affected by other elements than simply party discipline. The inability of the Conservatives to form opposition alliances would seem to indicate that inter-party attitudes are present in the legislative process. These attitudes should manifest themselves in voting behaviour and, in turn should affect support for Government. By examining party support for Government when controlled for partisan motions, conclusions can therefore be drawn about how individual parties reacted to other parties' parliamentary intentions and orientations.

Table 13 reveals a major distinction between traditional and minor party behaviour and the attitudes these parties hold towards one another. The table is representative of the number and percentage of times the opposition parties supported the Government when either the Liberals or the various factions of the Opposition made motions. On Government motions the opposition parties frequently acted in concert against the Liberals. But it must be remembered that on those motions the Opposition displayed their lowest attendance. The NDP supported the Liberals on their governmental motions more often than any other party and on nine motions even the Conservatives broke their 'official' role of Opposition and supported the Government.

Table 13

Opposition Party Support for Government, by Party Originating Motion

Political Party	Liberal Motions n=37				Conservative Motions n=44			
	Support		Opposition		Support		Opposition	
	Frequency	Percent*	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Conservative	9	24%	28	76%	0	0%	44	100%
NDP**	23	64	13	36	24	56	19	44
Social Credit	17	46	20	54	28	64	16	36
Total	49	45	61	55	52	40	79	60
	NDP Motions n=21				Social Credit Motions n=11			
Conservative	6	29%	15	71%	10	91%	1	9%
NDP	2	9	19	91	6	55	5	45
Social Credit	12	57	9	43	1	9	10	91
Total	20	32	43	68	17	52	16	48

* All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number

** NOTE: The NDP abstained upon a Conservative and Liberal Motion

Behaviour upon Conservative motions is extremely interesting in that it shows that not only were the Tories isolated from the remainder of the Opposition in general, but reveals that the Conservative's inability to co-opt minor party support became additionally acute upon their own motions. In fact, it appears that the NDP and Social Credit had a subtle distaste for Conservative motions. The two minor parties were more willing to support the Government, than their theoretical allies, the Conservatives, upon Tory motions. One could conclude, therefore, that the two minor parties seem to see their own parliamentary position and fate more closely aligned with the governing power (the Liberals) than the opposing power (the Conservatives).

The voting pattern upon NDP and Social Credit motions may, in part, explain this behaviour. When NDP or Social Credit moved amendments the Conservatives had a comparatively high incidence of support for the Government. This increased support was especially apparent upon Social Credit motions. When minor party motions were presented in parliament, the Conservatives were as likely to side with the Government as with the NDP and even less likely to side with the Social Credit. Voting displayed by the minor parties seemed to be reciprocated by the Tories. It would appear therefore that the Conservatives had more affinity with their omnibus orientation than with the necessity of acting in opposition with the third parties. However, this was only the case when the Tories were faced with minor party motions.

Table 13 also shows that the NDP and Social Credit had little affinity with each other's motions. Both parties were more likely to support the Liberals than to side with their minor counterpart. Social Credit and NDP alliances were therefore not created out of any mutual ideology, but rather to support the Government and to oppose Conservative legislation.

It would appear that the Liberals were able to isolate the Conservatives, as the only real opposition during Liberal and Conservative motions. At the same time the Government was able to turn that Conservative opposition into support when either the NDP or Social Credit Party originated motions. Government, in this minority situation therefore appears to have redefined the 'defined' roles of parties in parliament. Since no party was acting as the official Opposition at all times, Opposition was sporadic and fragmented. Adversary politics were not fought upon Government-Opposition lines but rather, conflict was on disjoint party lines, each party having a distinctive role perception and parliamentary attitude.

From the overall voting patterns it could be concluded that (1) there was little concentrated effort to oust the Government by a united Opposition and (2) the minor parties tended to align themselves with Government on Tory motions, while the two major parties joined together to ward off the ideological and regional interests of the NDP and Social Credit. It seems that the parties in Opposition could not reconcile the mutually ascribed role of 'Opposition', which they held in parliament, with their own self-perception of what their party stood for in relation to the electorate. Finally it will be contended that the Government was able to co-opt third party support by allowing them a role in the decision-making process. In this sense the minor parties could become part of the decision-making process either through their support of Government or by having the Liberals adopt parts of the NDP and Social Credit programme.[1]

To examine party behaviour when confronted with those legislative topics which reflect role perception, Table 14 shows Opposition support for Government by issue area. The voting patterns displayed by issue category are quite similar in that Opposition support is split quite evenly with the preponderance of Conservative votes going against the Government while Social Credit and NDP support tends to oscillate depending on the issue. The most marked exception to this general pattern is the increased NDP support for the Government on 'Free votes', 'Nationalism' and 'Ideological' questions. Likewise, Social Credit support for the Liberals increases on questions of 'Nationalism' and 'Regional' natures.

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[1] It should be noted that Table 13 reveals that the Liberals accepted two NDP and one Social Credit motion, whereas they rejected, out of hand all Conservative motions.

Table 14

Opposition Party Support for Government, by Issue Area

Political Party	Government Money Bills (n=12)				Address in Reply (n=9)				Free Vote (n=10)				Regional Question (n=4)			
	Support		Opposition		Support		Opposition		Support		Opposition		Support		Opposition	
	Frequency	Percent*	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Conservative	0	0%	12	100%	3	33%	6	67%	2	20%	8	80%	2	50%	2	50%
NDP	6**	55	5	45	1	11	8	89	10	100	0	0	1	25	3	75
Social Credit	5	42	7	48	2	22	7	78	3	30	7	70	3	75	1	25
Total	11	31	24	69	6	22	21	78	15	50	15	50	6	50	5	50
	Non-confidence (n=12)				Nationalism (n=14)				Ideological (n=11)				Other (n=12)			
Conservative	2	17%	10	83%	1	7%	13	93%	4	33%	7	67%	4	33%	8	67%
NDP	5**	45	6	55	10	71	4	29	6	55	5	45	8	67	4	33
Social Credit	8	69	4	31	13	93	1	7	5	45	6	55	6	50	6	50
Total	15	43	20	47	24	54	18	46	15	45	18	55	18	50	18	50
	Welfare (n=7)				Monetary Amendment (n=14)				National Economy (n=5)				Federalism (n=13)			
Conservative	3	46%	4	54%	2	14%	12	86%	1	20%	4	80%	1	33%	2	67%
NDP	3	46	4	54	3	21	11	79	1	20	4	80	2	67	1	33
Social Credit	4	54	3	46	5	36	9	64	2	40	3	60	2	67	1	33
Total	10	48	11	52	10	24	32	76	4	27	11	73	5	56	4	44

n=113

* All percents have been rounded to the nearest whole

** Note: An NDP abstention upon issue area

Both minor parties show a relative tendency to support the Government on non-confidence motions, with the Social Crediters displaying the stronger approval of government.

It is quite interesting to note that those issues for which the respective minority parties give Government their greatest support are the very same issues to which they give the strongest parliamentary attention (through their attendance). The NDP and Liberal's mutual support and voting behaviour for the above issues seem to indicate that these parties held similar convictions on what may be termed value-ridden questions. At the same time, it appears that the Social Credit Party was quite content with Liberal legislation and government in general, while the Liberals allowed their stand on questions of a regional nature to be quite coincident with the Social Credit position. The similarity in the voting behaviour of the Liberals and the minor parties upon those issues which the NDP and Social Credit identify, may indicate that these are the areas in which the Liberals compromised in order to gain third party support.

Table 14 also reveals that the only occassions on which all three Opposition parties acted aggressively in opposing the Government were on the 'Monetary Amendments', 'Address in Reply' and, to a lesser extent, 'Government Money Bills'. These issue areas are basically considered to be traditional areas of opposition.[2] However, the majority of opposition to Government on the money bills is attributable to the Conservatives. It would seem that the Opposition parties were (1) willing to oppose the Government on those issues that are defined as opposition motions, (2) in support of Government on issues coinciding with their own electoral or political orientations and (3) on the remaining issues willing to split the votes either for or against the Government depending on the issue content. It is apparent then that the demands of acting as a united Opposition were not constantly operationalized in Conservative, NDP, or Social Credit behaviour.

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[2] See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), The Government of Canada; 4th edition (1966), pp. 227-229, 378-379, 385, 409-410.

The tables presented on 'Support' do much to explain the maintenance of Liberal government for the years under investigation. However, the presentation thus far has revealed little in the way of the rationale or psychology involved behind the demonstrated behaviour. By viewing the individual party's behaviour when acting in support or opposition to Government more can be determined about the attitudes of parties in parliament.

B) The Variables of Support

By examining Opposition party attendance and cohesion when controlled for governmental support new insights into party behaviour can be made. An alteration in behaviour upon support for Government should indicate simply, that a party has changed its parliamentary tactics or its attitude to the legislative process depending on the role function of supporting or opposing.

Table 15 presents Opposition party attendance upon support or opposition to Government. This dichotomy is further compared with the parties average turnout for the entire sample. A corresponding Table 16 shows the average frequency of cross-over votes when the Opposition parties are either supporting or opposing the Liberals, compared with their overall frequency of crossing over.

Tables 15 and 16 probably tell more about parliamentary party behaviour than any other in the study thus far. Hypothetically, all parties are more prone to attend and thus participate in the legislative process when they are supporting the Government. Duverger explains this behaviour in part:

> The party with an electoral primacy over the others most often tries to govern with the others in order to share the responsibility of power. [In doing so, the others] remain dominated by the psychology of the regime.[3]

When the Opposition factions become part of the regime, through their temporary support, they adopt the characteristics of the regime and as a result tend to behave as it does. When tacit alliances are made with the Government (in the form of Opposition support) attendance becomes markedly higher. In becoming more cohesive and exhibiting greater turnout the Opposition parties have thereby taken on the

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[3] M. Duverger, *Political Parties* (1951), p. 325.

Table 15

Opposition Party Attendance upon Support for Government

Political Party	Attendance		
	Support	Opposition	Average
Conservative	71.2%	65.7	66.8
NDP	75.8	63.6	69.6
Social Credit	74.4	54.4	64.8

n=113

Table 16

Opposition Cross-overs upon Support for Government

Political Party	Frequency of Cross-overs per Division		
	Support	Opposition	Average
Conservtive	3.00	1.56	1.71
NDP	.54	.41	.49
Social Credit	1.32	2.50	1.91

n=113

behavioural traits of the Liberals. By sharing the power and responsibility of governing when they support the Government the Opposition parties are thus adopting 'the psychology of the regime'.

Earlier, it was tentatively proposed that the governing party would maintain higher parliamentary attendance. Apparently, the causal factor for this superior attendance is not the ascribed status of governing but rather the actual function of operating in a decision-making capacity. The increased attendance displayed by the opposition parties when they supported the Government would tend to bear out this latter hypothesis.

In contrast to this behaviour is the finding that when the opposition parties oppose the Government, their interest (characterized by their attendance) begins to falter suggesting a disinterest or dissatisfaction with their parliamentary role of 'Opposition'. The low parliamentary turnout of these parties when they are acting in opposition would indicate that they either had no interest in defeating the Government or that they sensed a futility in attempting to overthrow the incumbents. Moreover, this behaviour seems to have a collateral relationship with the party's proximity to Government. The greater the electoral success of a party or the greater the party's role in the decisicn-making process, the more likely it is their attendance will be unaffected when they support the Government. The Conservatives displayed the least deviation between their average (regular) attendance and their attendance when supporting the Government. The lure and potential of becoming 'the Government' coupled with their 'official' parliamentary status and powers which accrue from that status, enable the Conservatives to remain relatively content when acting in opposition.

On the other hand, the most regionally based and fragmented party, Social Credit, demonstrated the most marked deviation between average turnout and their attendance upon support for Government. Having only a nominal number of motions and position in the decision-making process, the Social Credit Party appears to display a general lack of efficacy in the parliamentary process. The NDP's behaviour seems to lie between that of the Social Credit and Conservative Parties.

Table 16 does not allow for such a linear explanation of party behaviour. The Opposition parties' cohesion does not follow the same pattern as their turnout. However, there appears to be relationship between the degree of differentiation in a party's support-attendance and that party's cohesion. The Social Credit Party demonstrated the greatest difference in their support-attendance when compared to their opposition turnout. Likewise, their incidence of cross-over voting when supporting the Liberals is almost halved over that when they are opposing. The NDP's turnout is also higher when they support the Government but their cohesion is almost the same. The Conservatives too, are slightly more interested in attending the House when they support the Government, but on these occasions, their indices of cross-over voting almost doubles.

If the increase in attendance when supporting over attendance when opposing can be construed to represent an eagerness to support the Government, then it can be maintained that the more interested a party is in supporting the Government the more cohesive it becomes upon giving support. The Social Credit Party is therefore the most eager to support the Government because they have everything to gain by doing so. The balance of power which they hold during the minority situation is something they may very well lose should a vote force the parties back on the hustings. As a result of backing the 'winning side', Social Credit seems to become more sure of their position in the legislative process. Their cohesion increases thereby indicating a membership affinity to the party's choice in supporting the Government.

Conservative cohesion upon support for the Government was the converse of Social Credit's. Their cohesion tended to break down upon support of Government. This behaviour would indicate that the Conservative membership had difficulty reconciling their 'official' role in parliament with the parties' decision to side with the Government. It seems therefore that while the ascribed role of 'Opposition' is not constantly a determinant in the direction of the Conservative's voting behaviour, this role does affect the strength of the party's cohesion.

The NDP do not seem to be as heavily influenced by the behavioural demands of being either 'ins' or 'outs'. As a result their cohesion is not markedly affected by either their support for or opposition to the Liberals. Their stable cohesion would indicate that the NDP are quite sure of their parliamentary position regardless of their stance.

The definition of 'parliamentary role' and the proximity of a party to the regime appears to have a marked affect on party behaviour. This is especially the case for the Conservatives and Social Credit. However, a party's electoral orientation and success also appears to direct party behaviour.

Both minor parties are not as obligated to oppose as are the Conservatives and can therefore adopt a less stringent attitude in their legislative behaviour. Hence, their voting decisions seemed to based on the necessity of running parliament except when they are faced with definite cues. This is essentially true for both third parties, but the Social Credit seems more insecure in their parliamentary position. As a result they tend to temporize until the situation itself defines their role. Social Credit cohesion and attendance is better when 'their' interests are being dealt with and when they temporarily become part of the regime.

This is not quite as true for the NDP. Their high turnout and cohesion on issues and matters of conscience or ideology seem to make their overall role in parliament more definite. Aware of their minority position in parliament, the NDP appear willing to support the Liberals in order to consolidate it. However, the NDP's stability upon opposition to Government would add credence to the contention that they made no special effort or change in party organization to sustain the Liberals.

The Conservatives, on the other hand, appear to be caught between their responsibility to act as the 'Opposition' and their desire to become the regime itself. Their parliamentary role is to oppose and to offer alternatives, yet their electoral orientations breed the desire to accentuate power and become the regime. However, their parliamentary behaviour seems to exhibit a frustration in wielding the alternatives that are available to them. Being in such a situation they seem to show some of the characteristics of the Social Credit party. Conservative interest in the policy making process increases when they are supporting the policy-makers, yet when they are acting in support their cohesion (unlike Social Credit's) breaks down. Their dual yet opposing roles seem to pull them apart and thereby minimize their parliamentary potency. Because of their isolation and legislative inadequacy, the Conservatives are unable to fulfill their audit function, and as a result of this they are unable or unwilling to unseat the Government. In turn, the Conservative's weakness and isolation leaves the minor parties little alternative but to support the superior Liberals.

The Liberals, as compared with the Opposition, have the most clearly defined role: to govern. This definition provides them with cues for their legislative behaviour. They are held directly responsible for decision-making and if they desire to maintain their role, they must have the ability to produce superior discipline and strategy. Concomitantly, their status as decision-makers, provides a 'lure' for the opposition parties that is unavailable to the Conservatives. It is through the Government that the minor parties can convert their special interests into legislative policy. The minor parties can thus see more benefit in siding with the Liberals than with their Opposition counterparts.

2. The Crucial Divisions

The final step in the analysis of how the Liberals stayed in power requires a re-statement of the data. This will be attained by collapsing the divisions down to those which held the greatest potential for Government defeat.*

By our calculation, 67 divisions were of major consequence such that defeat could theoretically have brought the Government down.[5] Admittedly, not all of these divisions would have caused immediate Government defeat. For example, although the Reply from the Throne Speech is an important parliamentary motion, defeat on such an issue during the beginning of a session would not usually be considered a prerequisite of Government resignation.[6] However, while a defeat on many of these motions may not immediately bring the Government down, a defeat could cause such public embarrassment as to warrant a threat to the Government's electoral credibility. This situation arising would presumedly result in public pressure for the Opposition to move a formal motion of non-confidence. Therefore, of the 67 major divisions the Government needed Opposition support on 23. These remaining 'crucial' divisions could be considered a 'form' of non-confidence vote.

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*See Appendix II for a description and definition of those divisions which are considered to be 'crucial'.

Table 17 reveals on exactly what issues the Government needed support in order to ward off defeat or embarrassment. On their own major pieces of legislation (money bills,

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[5] The hesitation in pinpointing what exactly constitutes a defeat of Government is a direct consequence of the nature of the problem. Theoretically, defeat is the result of a major or money bill being voted down or a direct vote of non-confidence being accepted by the House. However, it can be contended that the state of parliament is such that the governing party itself can decide what is a Government defeat. On February 19, 1968 the Liberals were defeated on the third reading of a major money bill. Pearson interpreted this defeat as a 'mistake' rather than a want of confidence and as a result did not resign.

[6] See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward (revised), op. cit., pp. 400-410; W. F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (1962), pp. 95-102, 139-140.

Table 17

Major Divisions by Issue, by Liberal Attendance Status

Issue Area	Liberal's Holding A Minority of Seats (Crucial)	Liberal's Holding A Majority of Seats	Total
Government Money Bills	3	9	12
Address in Reply	7	2	9
Non-confidence	7	5	12
Flag Debate	1	9	10
Medicare	0	4	4
Monetary Amendment	3	11	14
Pension Plan	2	4	6
Total	23	44	67

the flag, medicare and the pension plan) they rarely required Opposition support. By comparing the few major government bills on which the Government did need support with the actual support given to issues (Table 14) it becomes apparent that for these areas the Liberals received their greatest support from either the NDP or Social Credit Party. This would indicate that the minor opposition parties were allowed to fulfill their legislative function of opposing during those times when the Government (because of its superior attendance) could not have been defeated. It could also be assumed, therefore, that these parties would form alliances or support the Government when the Liberal's position was numerically threatened. This situation was also reflected by the NDP's occasional conspicuous abstentions. (The NDP abstained twice during the study: once on a Government money bill and once on a Non-confidence motion moved by the Conservatives. On both occasions the Liberals did not have enough members present and voting to ward off defeat had the Opposition acted in concert). This would indicate either that the NDP wished to sustain the Liberal Government but did not wish to support them outwardly, or that the Liberals were aware of NDP strategy and were prepared to call out only enough members necessary to carry the vote.

Non-confidence and the Address in Reply issue areas required the greatest need for opposition party support.

Normally, these motions are initiated by the Opposition.[7] Support for these two issue areas (seen in Table 14) shows that the Social Credit party tended to vote in bloc with the Government on Non-confidence motions but that all opposition parties tended to oppose the Government on the Address in Reply divisions. The data thus far therefore does not explain all of the factors for the Liberal's success. By viewing party behaviour upon 'crucial' divisions the final explanation for the Liberal's longevity may be achieved.

Shown in Tables 18-20 are some important aspects of party behaviour displayed for those crucial votes where the Government did not have enough members present and voting to carry the House. Table 18 shows that most of the Liberal motions were 'safe' when they were presented to the House. Only four out of the 37 motions initiated by the Liberals required extra-party support or alliances. It appears that the majority of these crucial motions introduced in opposition were moved by the Conservatives. But the tables presented in the previous section on 'Support' suggest that the minor parties were not likely to support Tory motions. Table 19 reinforces this tenet in part, because only the Social Credit Party displays a high incidence of support for the

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[7] It should be noted that not all of these divisions were moved by the Opposition. One of the divisions in the 'Non-Confidence' column was moved by Pearson himself (February 28, 1968) following the Liberal defeat nine days earlier. On that occasion confidence was upheld 139-119 with Social Credit supporting the Government.

Table 18

Number of Crucial Divisions, by Party Initiating Motion

Political Party	Number of Motions
Liberal	4
Conservative	12
NDP	6
Social Credit	1

n=23

Table 19

Opposition Party Support for Government upon Crucial Divisions

Political Party	Support Frequency	Support Percent*	Opposition Frequency	Opposition Percent
Conservative	3	13%	20	87%
NDP	7**	33	14	67
Social Credit	13	56	10	44
Total	23	34	44	66
n=23				

* All percents have been rounded to the nearest whole

** NDP total does not equal 23 because of two party abstentions

Table 20

Frequency of Cross-over Voting, by Party, upon Crucial Divisions

Political Party	Votes to Support Government	Votes to Oppose Government	Total
Liberal	0	0	0
Conservative	11	0	11
NDP	16	4	20
Social Credit	60	4	64
Total	87	8	95

n=23

Government in the crucial situations. It appears that on many occasions the NDP was likely to back the Conservatives in a crucial motion facing the Liberals.

Table 20 shows that the incidence of cross-over voting for these crucial divisions was quite high. Although these tables are basically descriptive, they do present additional information on the nature of parliamentary party behaviour. It appears that while the NDP were sometimes committed to oppose the Government (through their support of the Conservatives), it was mainly the Tories who initiated these motions acting in their official capacity of confronting the Government. It is also apparent that minor party cohesion tends to break down under the crucial votes. The potential for Government defeat appears to have an adverse affect on minor party cohesion. A further investigation into cross-over voting should therefore reveal that the Liberals received piecemeal rather than continuous or permanent support during the crucial motions.

Table 21 shows a comparative frequency of cross-over voting for the 23 divisions upon Opposition support or rejection of Government. These frequencies are also compared to the average number of cross-overs for the crucial divisions and for the study sample. Table 21 in conjunction with Table 20, shows that cross-over voting during these crucial divisions, both increases and goes towards the Government. All the parties are more likely to have members breaking

Table 21

Opposition Party Cross-overs upon Crucial Divisions,

by Support for Government

Political Party	Number of Cross-overs per Crucial Division Support	Opposition	Average	Cross-over Average in Sample
Conservative	.00	.55	.48	1.71
NDP	.57	1.00	.87	.49
Social Credit	.31	6.00	2.78	1.91
n=23				n=113

party lines when they are opposing the Government. Contrasting with this behaviour, is the finding that the opposition parties seem to reach a consensus and achieve a party solidarity when they support the Liberals. This is especially the case for the Social Credit Party. For a party that was as bifurcated and fragmented as it was purported to be, the Social Credit membership displayed extremely high cohesion when the party was aligning itself with the Government. Again, it is only the NDP whose cohesion is relatively unaffected when they are supporting the Liberals. But even the NDP's average cross-over is higher on the crucial divisions than on the whole. Only the Conservatives had a lower incidence of cross-over voting on the crucial divisions as compared to their overall average. The additional stress provided by the importance of these votes seems to heighten the Conservative's ability to perceive themselves as 'the Opposition'. Both the NDP and the Social Credit Party's cohesion breaks down under the threat of government defeat, the Social Credit's completely and the NDP's only when they are acting in opposition. Unlike the Conservatives, the minor parties and especially Social Credit, did not behave in their role of "Opposition' when fulfilling that role could mean the termination of parliament. It seems therefore that the Liberals were able to benefit from the rift within the Social Credit ranks and from the isolation of the Conservatives. At the same time, the Government was able to attain absolute cohesion when their tenure was threatened. It was this situation that enabled the Liberals to continue in office upon the 'crucial' divisions.

In conclusion, it can be held that behavioural tendencies that were mildly displayed by the various parties during the study were accentuated upon the mounting stress of continuing the governmental process. This would indicate that the impending threat of parliamentary dissolution has a great effect on party behaviour. As the clues to the Government's future become more clear, the actual role a party played in the game began to affect the various parties' behaviour. The Conservatives became more aware of their role as the Official Opposition and potential successor to power. As a result they became more cohesive and adamant in their role of opposing. The Social Crediters, on the other hand, seemed to become aware of their position as a minor party playing a minor role in parliament and as such, hindered in their electoral fortunes should 'the game' force an election. Under the crucial divisions, when supporting the Liberals, the Social Credit party was able to dispense with internal in-fighting and attain party solidarity. The necessity of consolidating their position and continuing parliament seemed to take over as the determining factor in their behaviour. The NDP differed from both parties in their demonstrated behaviour under mounting stress: it changed only slightly. It appears that the NDP's self-perception as a party of conscience was more salient in directing their party behaviour than the demands of acting in opposition.

3. Summary of Study Findings

The requirements of a parliamentary system based on the Westmінister model would appear to negate the possibility of minority government. However, the study has shown that a two-plus party system and a minority situation can alter the traditional perceptions of party behaviour in parliament. Experience revealed an unwillingness for a unified Opposition to develop during the Pearson-Liberal government. It was also apparent that the Liberals did not gain continuous support from any one party and as a result it is impossible to assume that the Liberals formed any binding or formal alliances. Although coalition government did not develop in the 26th and 27th parliaments the Liberal's tenure remained relatively stable. Our analysis presented can thus submit alternate conclusions as to the operation of the Pearson minority government.

The data points to three main causes for the Liberal's continued maintenance of power. Firstly, the Liberal member's religious adherence to party discipline in the House is of maximum importance. Both in terms of legislative bloc voting and membership turnout, the Liberals provided a well-organized party which pursued the implementation of policy. Regardless of the journalistic speculation as to the Liberals weakness in caucus, committee and cabinet, it is apparent that these weaknesses were not carried over into parliament or displayed in the Liberals' legislative tactics. But it must be remembered that Liberal discipline was only important in light of the fragmented Opposition. The Opposition was made up of three parties, none of whom seemed to have the same parliamentary interests. The fact that the Liberals maintained stringent discipline upon its members and could therefore ward off defeat in most cases, allowed the opposition parties to pursue their interests. Defeat appeared futile or disadvantageous to the minor parties therefore they rechanneled their efforts to their special interests. The regional interests of the Social Credit Party and the so-called ideological priorities of the NDP, therefore left the Conservatives in a position of being an isolated yet official Opposition.

Secondly, the lack of party discipline (highlighted by the lack of party cohesion) within the Social Credit ranks produced important cross-over voting that enabled the Liberals to gain enough support to pass legislation upon crucial divisions. There also appeared to be open antagonism between the Social Credit and Conservatives during this period. The Socreds, therefore, had an important effect in disorganizing the Opposition's balance of power in the House. The Social Crediters either supported the Government en bloc or when they did oppose, dissatisfaction with the party's stand was such that it created fragmented individual support for the Liberals.

Thirdly, when either the strength of Liberal Party discipline or the support of the Social Credit was not enough to carry a motion for the Government, support could be found either from the Conservatives or the NDP and sometimes both. The NDP tended to support the Liberals when want of confidence was raised, while the Tories sided with the Government upon Social Credit motions. This fluctuating opposition party support was probably a function of the Opposition's inability to perceive their role as a united body, and their diverse interests. It seems that each of these parties defined their own role in parliament and that the individual roles the various parties held could not be compromised on the aggregate level. The lack of support for one another's motions and interests prevented any concentrated Opposition rallies against the Liberals. When the opposition parties could finally arrive on common grounds for joint opposition, their internal cohesion and attendance was such that they were unable to threaten the Government with defeat.

These factors were not always individually operative, as has been seen: a combination of these, while varying from issue to issue was necessary to maintain the Liberal government. It was therefore by virtue of one or more of these factors that the Pearson government was upheld.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The Liberal government's ability to control parliament seems a consequence of certain features of minority government in Canada. As the study indicates, the functioning of minority parliaments is not quite as straight-forward as might first appear is the case. The following is a brief review of certain characteristics found by this study.

(1) The explanation of minority government demands a deviation from a party theory that has been generated by a two-party system and majority parliaments. The parliamentary representation of third parties and their now frequent control of the 'balance of power' in minority parliaments dictates that the traditional roles of 'Government' and 'Opposition' will not likely be the sole determinant of legislative party behaviour.

(2) It appears, from the study, that minority governments will promote legislative exigencies to override the tradition that requires third parties to act in constant opposition to Government. Minority parliaments appear election conscious and hence promote the expression and satisfaction of demands rooted in the various political party's electoral

orientations. Rather than acting as a united Opposition these parties will each seek to further future electoral advantage. Therefore specific party interests are accentuated and become a determinant of legislative behaviour. Since the Official Opposition is most interested in becoming the Government, its behaviour in a minority situation where this interest is closest to being realized will most manifest this interest. Similarly, third party behaviour has appeared to reflect the promotion of their own particularistic policies.

(3) Minority government also demands back-bencher subservience within the governing party. Therefore the Government caucus must be more tightly controlled than in a majority situation.

(4) Because minority parliaments appear ripe for enhancing specific party advantages, their operation does not necessarily subdue the isolationist roles that the parties generate on the hustings. Antagonisms and inter-party competition continue to exist: when carried over into the parliament level these tend to be manifested in a fragmented Opposition. As a result co-operation among the Opposition parties only results on an ad hoc basis when an opportunity of increasing legislative advantage is perceived.

(5) As the study has demonstrated, continuing alliances

are not always necessary in all minority situations to maintain the continuity of the legislative process. Because the Opposition parties each seek the fulfillment of their diverse interests and thus are divided, the Government-Opposition relationship in passing legislation, becomes little different from that in majority situations. The governing party, in the minority case, need not waffle to any greater extent, because of the Opposition's unwillingness (or inability) to act in unison as one to defeat the Government. The acceptance of minor motions and the threat of parliamentary sanctions appear to be enough to keep the Opposition in line. Because the traditional role of opposing Government does not appear to be foremost in the minds of all opposition parties, the stability of minority parliaments is relatively guaranteed.

The divisiveness within the Opposition ranks is imperative to understanding governmental power in minority situations. The presence of third parties in parliament not only redefines who is the 'Opposition' but also who opposes. The Government, because of its governing status and the powers that accrue from that status appears able, by accepting third party orientations to isolate the Official Opposition effectively. The role of Opposition cannot always be maintained by all parties or the Government would fall.

Particularly for a party restricted to regional electoral success the prospects from such an event occurring cannot be overly appealing. The strictly defined role of Opposition may not therefore be salient for all the parties involved. Both the Social Credit and to a less extent, NDP behaviour displayed in the study indicates that the continuation of parliament and the furtherance of specific interests are stronger determinants of voting behaviour for third parties than the need to oppose Government. The ambivalence of a single clearly defined role for all opposition parties in parliament hence appears to account in a large part for the stability of minority governments. It therefore appears that the opposition parties adopt their electoral orientation as their legislative role in minority parliaments. This contention is apparent in the parliamentary party behaviour demonstrated during the Pearson years.

Generally speaking, for the 26th and 27th parliaments, the Tories were able to act as an organized Opposition. Because of this role the Conservatives seemed isolated from the other opposition parties. They acted most effectively in Opposition when the Government was most susceptible to defeat; when the cues to the Conservative's orientation as a success-minded party were closest to being realized. This consequence appears to have restricted the Conservative's ability to organize any lasting Opposition alliances. This strict Opposition role definition was apparent anathema to the contrasting roles of the minor parties and seems to have prevented opposition alliances. Moreover, the Conservatives showed a tendency to support the Government on Social Credit and (to a lesser extent) NDP motions, which behaviour could very well have further alienated their potential Opposition allies. As indicated, however, the Tories did oppose the Liberals on certain crucial divisions, displaying their desire to become the regime, but on these occasions they did not muster either the attendance or the third party support necessary to defeat the incumbents.

NDP behaviour, on the surface, appears quite enigmatic. They tended to act as a well organized third party in opposition by displaying a general lack of cross-over voting. However, the party's attendance and frequent support for the Government upholds the contention that the NDP was more interested in attempting to bring specific interests to the floor than in actually unseating the Government. Their party discipline was therefore organized and oriented toward this end. Although the NDP did not consistently either support or oppose the Government their position in parliament appears better defined than the other opposition parties. The party's high level of cohesion and their increased attendance upon ideological questions indicate that the party's stricter ideological commitments provide a strong perception of their parliamentary role and as a result, directs much of the NDP's legislative behaviour.

Social Credit was the most fragmented party in Parliament. Their behaviour seemed to display a general lack of political efficacy. They were the furthest removed from the Government (or regime) in terms of electoral success, hence likely the most eager to insure the Liberal's maintenance of power. When the Government was faced with impending defeat, the Social Credit Party became additionally bifuricated when opposing the Liberals and exceptionally cohesive when acting in support. The marked change in party behaviour as a result of supporting the Government seems to reveal that Social Crediters were extremely insecure in their role of Opposition. Yet the party seemed to see its role as a third party representing regional or constituent interests. Our analysis suggests that the Social Credit Party was therefore aware of its 'minor' role in parliament but also that in a minority situation they would be able to fulfill their specific interests if they assisted the Government. As a result, Social Crediters showed a general dissatisfaction with the role of 'Opposition' in the parliamentary system. It was only through their alliances with the Government that a new interest in 'the game' was displayed. That interest was reflected through their increased participation and cohesion when supporting the Government.

In conclusion it appears that parties display different behaviour depending on their role orientations.

It seems apparent the traditional concept that 'Government-Opposition' roles determine party behaviour in parliament does not hold up under scrutiny. It is impossible to determine conclusively, by this type of study, why parties adopt different orientations within the legislature but it may be beneficial to offer an alternative avenue of research which may, in turn, answer this question.

One of the major factors accounting for the Liberal's success during the 26th and 27th parliaments was the inability or the unwillingness of the Opposition to stand together as as united body. While this study has suggested that there was an unwillingness on the part of the opposition parties to unite and defeat the Government, an investigation into the relationship between the executive and legislature during both minority and majority situations could very well prove that the Opposition is literally *unable* to defeat the Government.[1] By pursuing this line of study it may be seen if the ineffectives of legislatures is such that the Opposition is unable of wielding the sanctions of defeat. A study of this nature could both improve our knowledge of the operation of legislatures and bring us closer to understanding if parliament is capable of acting as 'the grand inquest of the nation' and in turn capable of operationalizing the theories of responsible government.

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[1] For a discussion on the 'state' of parliament and the effectiveness of the Opposition see T. Hockin ed., *Apex of Power* (1971); R. G. Robertson, "The Canadian Parliament and Cabinet in Face of Modern Demands", in *Canadian Public Administration*, XI, 3 (Fall, 1968), 272-289; J. A. A. Lovink, "Parliamentary Reform and Governmental Effectiveness" in *Canadian Public Administration*, XVI, 1, (Spring, 1973) 35-55; F. Schindeler, *Responsible Government in Ontario* (1963), pp. 1-42.

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APPENDIX I

RECORDED DIVISIONS FOR THE 26th AND 27th PARLIAMENTS, 1963 - 1968

The following is a list of those 204 divisions found in the Canadian Parliamentary Debates for the 26th and 27th parliaments. These divisions are tabulated by (a) date of motion; (b) general topic of motion, and (c) the party initiating the motion. Those divisions marked with an asterisk (*) are those 113 divisions that were considered imperative in understanding the topic as outlined in the text. A more comprehensive explanation of these latter divisions is provided in Appendix II.

26th PARLIAMENT: APRIL 1963 - JUNE 1965

Motion Number	Date 1963	Issue	Party Moving
* 1	May 2	Nuclear Acquisition	NDP
* 2	May 21	(Budget) Amendment (Non-confidence)	P.C.
* 3	June 5	Nuclear Acquisition	NDP
* 4	June 24	(Budget) Non-confidence	P.C.
* 5	June 26	Budget	Lib.
6	July 2	Speaker's Decision	NDP
* 7	July 2	Budget Amendment	P.C.
8	July 11	Ruling of Chair	S.C.
9	July 29	Increase MP's Pay	Lib.
10	July 30	Ruling of Chair	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1963	Issue	Party Moving
* 11	Aug. 2	(Rules to) Establish Economic Council of Canada	P.C.
12	Aug. 2	Extention of Sales Tax	P.C.
13	Oct. 1	Ruling of Chair	P.C.
14	Oct. 1	Ruling of Chair	S.C.
15	Oct. 2	Defence Agreement (Nuclear Weapons)	P.C.
16	Oct. 7	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
17	Oct. 9	Speaker's Decision	S.C.
18	Oct. 9	Speaker's Decision	S.C.
* 19	Oct. 11	Maritime Transport (Union Control)	Lib.
* 20	Oct. 15	Agriculture--Gov't Lack of	S.C.
* 21	Oct. 15	Help Eastern Agriculture	P.C.
22	Oct. 17	Privilege and Election	P.C.
23	Oct. 18	Privilege and Election	NDP
24	Oct. 18	Adjourn debate on Privilege & Election	Lib.
25	Oct. 21	Send Privilege and Election back to Committee	S.C.
* 26	Oct. 22	Labour Relations (Gov't of Indecision)	P.C.
27	Oct. 23	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
28	Oct. 28	Speaker's Decision	S.C.
29	Oct. 29	Hear Member of P.C.	P.C.
30	Oct. 29	Store Weapons in Quebec	S.C.
* 31	Oct. 29	Abandon Weapons Amendment	P.C.
* 32	Oct. 30	Reform Tax Act	P.C.
* 33	Nov. 5	Unemployment (Need for Action)	NDP
34	Nov. 5	Unemployment Amendment	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1963	Issue	Party Moving
35	Nov. 7	Confirmation of Chair	S.C.
* 36	Nov. 12	Promote Federalism Rather than Condemning Government	NDP
* 37	Nov. 13	Refer Tax Act to Committee of Whole	P.C.
38	Nov. 29	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
* 39	Dec. 12	Pension Act Audit	P.C.
	1964		
* 40	Feb. 21	Address in Reply	NDP
41	Feb. 24	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
42	Feb. 25	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
* 43	Feb. 25	Address in Reply	P.C.
* 44	Feb. 27	Address in Reply	P.C.
* 45	Feb. 27	Address in Reply	P.C.
46	Mar. 4	Trans Canada Aircraft Purchase	S.C.
* 47	Mar. 19	Non-confidence (in Chairman of Whole)	S.C.
* 48	Mar. 20	Address in Reply	NDP
49	Mar. 24	Budget Amendment	P.C.
50	Apr. 6	Amendment to Abolish Senate	NDP
* 51	Apr. 7	Extend Winter Works in Extreme Climates	S.C.
* 52	Apr. 21	Transfer Veterans Hospital to Province	P.C.
* 53	May 1	Non-confidence (in Minister of Transport)	P.C.
* 54	May 5	Province Develop Water Supply	S.C.
* 55	May 5	Lack of National Policy in Water and Resources	P.C.
56	May 14	Investigation of Maps	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1964	Issue	Party Moving
* 57	May 26	Eastern Agriculture (Failure of Government to Take Action)	P.C.
58	May 28	Amend Territorial Sea and Fish Zone Bill	NDP
59	June 4	Speaker's Ruling	NDP
60	June 5	Columbia River and Protocal	Lib.
61	June 19	Speaker's Ruling	S.C.
62	June 19	Remove P.C. Member from House	Lib.
* 63	July 16	Student Loans Bill Amendment	S.C.
* 64	July 20	Student Loans Bill	Lib.
* 65	July 24	Student Loans Bill	Lib.
66	Aug. 17	Privilege and Election	S.C.
67	Aug. 17	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
* 68	Sept. 1	Flag Debate Amendment to Amendment	P.C.
* 69	Sept. 3	Flag Debate Amendment (Maple Leaf)	NDP
70	Sept. 8	Flag Debate Amendment (Maple Leaf)	S.C.
71	Sept. 17	National Security Question	NDP
72	Sept. 28	Speaker's Decision	NDP
73	Sept. 29	Farm Machines Credit Bill	P.C.
74	Oct. 29	Ruling of Chair	P.C.
75	Nov. 12	Provincial Payment of Interest	P.C.
* 76	Nov. 18	Pension Plan	Lib.
* 77	Dec. 3	Adjourn Flag Committee Report	P.C.
* 78	Dec. 8	Flag Committee Debate	P.C.
79	Dec. 9	Proceed to Order of Day	NDP
*80	Dec. 10	Amendment of Flag Motion	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1964	Issue	Party Moving
* 81	Dec. 14	Flag Debate (Motion for Closure)	Lib.
* 82	Dec. 14	Flag Committee Amendment	P.C.
83	Dec. 14	Hear P.C. Member	P.C.
* 84	Dec. 14	Motion for Concurrence (Flag Committee Report)	Lib.
85*	Dec. 17	Speaker's Decision	NDP
* 86	Dec. 17	Flag Committee Amendment	P.C.
* 87	Dec. 17	Amendment to Flag Committee (Free Vote)	S.C.
* 88	Dec. 17	Option of Union Jack	Lib.
	1965		
89	Feb. 24	Electoral Officer Investigation	NDP
90	Mar. 9	Chairman's Ruling	P.C.
91	Mar. 26	Old Age Pension Amendment	P.C.
92	Mar. 29	Pension Plan Amendment	NDP
93	Mar. 29	Speaker's Decision	S.C.
* 94	Mar. 29	Old Age Pension	Lib.
* 95	Mar. 30	Establish Program Bill	P.C.
* 96	Apr. 7	Address in Reply	NDP
* 97	Apr. 9	Address in Reply	P.C.
98	Apr. 12	Speaker's Decision	S.C.
* 99	Apr. 12	Address in Reply	S.C.
100	Apr. 13	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
101	Apr. 29	Hear NDP Member	NDP
*102	Apr. 29	Ways and Means Budget Amendment	NDP

Motion Number	Date 1965	Issue	Party Moving
103	May 3	Question of Privilege	NDP
*104	May 3	Budget Amendment	P.C.
105	May 4	Speaker's Decision	P.C.
*106	May 5	Budget	Lib.
*107	May 11	U.S.-Can. Auto Agreement	NDP
*108	May 17	Senate Retirement Bill Amendment	NDP
*109	May 18	Senate Retirement Bill Amendment	P.C.
110	June 3	Business Committee's Estimates	P.C.
*111	June 11	Shortening Debate Time	Lib.
*112	June 11	Income Tax Bill	Lib.
113	June 22	Indian Claims Bill	NDP
*114	June 28	Income Tax Amendment	NDP
	1966	27th PARLIAMENT: JANUARY 1966 - APRIL 1968	
115	Jan. 20	Hear P.C. Member	P.C.
*116	Jan. 21	Spy Case--Civilian Surveilance	NDP
*117	Jan. 25	Address in Reply	P.C.
118	Jan. 27	Hear Independent Lib. Member	P.C.
119	Jan. 28	Address in Reply	P.C.
120	Mar. 9	Distribute Information	P.C.
121	Mar. 10	Hear NDP Member	P.C.
122	Mar. 10	Question of Privilege	NDP
*123	Mar. 22	Consumer Protection Against Rising Costs of Living	NDP
*124	Mar. 22	Consumer Protection	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1966	Issue	Party Moving
*125	Apr. 4	Abolish Capital Punishment	S.C.
*126	Apr. 5	Five Year Trial on Capital Punishment	Lib.
*127	Apr. 21	Budget Amendment	P.C.
*128	Apr. 23	Repeal Power to Commute Death Sentence	Lib.
129	May 2	'Seven Days Dispute'--CBC	Lib.
*130	May 3	Munsinger-Deplore Gov't us of RCMP for Information	P.C.
131	May 17	Mortgage Loan Act Amendment	P.C.
132	May 19	Union of Newfoundland	Lib
133	June 6	Yukon Act Amendment	P.C.
134	June 27	Table Public Utilities Bill	NDP
135	July 14	St Lawrence Posrt Bill Amendment	NDP
136	July 14	St. Lawrence Ports Bill	Lib.
*137	July 14	St. Lawrence Ports Bill	Lib.
*138	July 31	Employment Resumes on Railway	Lib.
139	Sept. 7	Armed Forces Represent Confederation (no unification)	P.C.
*140	Oct. 6	Bond Act	Lib.
*141	Oct. 20	Medicare-Provincial Jurisdiction	P.C.
*142	Oct. 20	Medicare-Provinces Drop out if Desire	P.C.
143	Oct. 24	Question of Privilege	P.C.
*144	Oct. 25	Medicare Bill	Lib.
*145	Nov. 2	Armed Forces Represent Confederation	P.C.
*146	Nov. 22	Gov't Supply Bill Amendment	NDP
147	Dec. 8	Medicare--Back to Committee	P.C.

Motion Number	Date 1966	Issue	Party Moving
*148	Dec. 8	Medicare Bill	Lib.
149	Dec. 20	Guaranteed Income Supplement Bill--Back to Committee	NDP
*150	Dec. 20	Guaranteed Income Supplement Bill	Lib.
	1967		
*151	Jan. 27	Transportation Bill	Lib.
*152	Feb. 2	Canadian Forces Reorganization Amendment	P.C.
*153	Feb. 2	Canadian Forces Reorganization Bill	Lib.
*154	Feb. 9	Budget Amendment	P.C.
155	Feb. 16	Excise Tax and Old Age Security Amendment	NDP
*156	Feb. 16	Excise Tax and Old Age Security Bill	Lib.
*157	Feb. 23	Income Tax Bill	Lib
*158	Mar. 1	Immigration Appeal Board Amendment	NDP
159	Mar. 1	Immigration Appeal Board Amendment	NDP
*160	Mar. 2	Excise Tax and Old Age Security Amendment	NDP
*161	Mar. 2	Excise Tax and Old Age Security Bill	Lib.
*162	Mar. 15	Income Tax Bill	Lib.
*163	Mar. 21	Bank Bill Amendment	NDP
164	Mar. 21	Bank Bill Amendment	S.C.
*165	Mar. 21	Bank Bill	Lib.
166	Apr. 3	National Defence Bill--to Committee	Lib.
*167	Apr. 20	National Defence Bill--Committee	Lib.
*168	Apr. 25	Time Allotted to Debate	Lib.
169	May 11	BNA Formula Amendment	NDP

Motion Number	Date 1967	Issue	Party Moving
170	May 15	BNA Formula Amendment	S.C.
171	May 15	BNA Formula Amendment	P.C.
*172	May 17	Amendment to BNA Formula (Federal-Provincial Jurisdictions)	P.C.
173	May 24	Canadian External Affairs--Against Viet Nam	NDP
174	May 24	Against Viet Nam	P.C.
175	July 7	Summer Recess	Lib.
176	July 7	Adjournment	Lib.
*177	Oct. 3	Condemning Housing Crisis	P.C.
178	Oct. 5	Question of Privilege	Ind.
*179	Oct. 5	Budget Amendment	NDP
*180	Oct. 10	Budget Amendment	P.C.
181	Oct. 24	Pollution Statement	NDP
182	Oct. 24	Water Supply Bill Amendment	P.C.
*183	Nov. 8	Broadcasting Bill Amendment (Public Ownership)	P.C.
184	Nov. 13	Manpower and Immigration Amendment	P.C.
*185	Nov. 15	Capital Punishment--Adjourn Debate	S.C.
*186	Nov. 16	Capital Punishment Adjourn Debate	P.C.
*187	Nov. 21	Nationalization of Industry	NDP
*188	Nov. 21	Gov't Handling of the Economy	P.C.
*189	Nov. 23	Police Question in Death Penalty	S.C.
*190	Nov. 30	Police Question in Death Penalty	P.C.
*191	Nov. 30	Death Santence Amendment	P.C.
*192	Nov. 30	Death Sentence	Lib.

Motion Number	Date 1967	Issue	Party Moving
*193	Dec. 7	Budgwt Amendment	NDP
*194	Dec. 11	Budget Amendment	P.C.
	1968		
195	Feb. 1	Insurance Company Takeover	NDP
*196	Feb. 6	Income Tax Bill	Lib.
*197	Feb. 7	Income Tax Bill--to Committee	Lib.
*198	Feb. 19	Income Tax Bill	Lib.
*199	Feb. 28	Non-confidence	Lib.
200	Feb. 29	Insurance Takeover	NDP
*201	Mar. 13	Banking Act	Lib.
*202	Mar. 15	Tax Act	Lib.
203	Mar. 20	Adjournment	Lib.
204	Mar. 20	Change in Committee Membership	Lib.

7

APPENDIX II

IMPERATIVE DIVISIONS USED AS STUDY SAMPLE

The following is a list of those 113 divisions which constitute a focus for the greater part of the study. These 'imperatives' (as mentioned) were obtained by removing those divisions which were either: (a) clearly procedural (regardless of attendance) or (b) issues of lesser substantive content, in which the Government had a clear majority of five or more voting members. The remaining divisions which are presented in this Appendix therefore are (a) by their nature, important bills or amendments, whose acceptance or defeat could threaten the Government's position or (b) of lesser import, but lack a majority of sitting Liberals.

These divisions are categorized according to 1) number, 2) date of motion and 3) issue. The titles for this column were obtained from the text of the motion as it appeared in the Canadian Parliamentary Debates, 4) Issue Category: this column is a collapsed version of column 3. An explanation of each of their contents appears in Chapter 2 of this study, 5) Liberal Attendance Status: this column was included to give the reader a better understanding of the Government's attendance. The headings 'Minority', 'Stalemate' amd 'Majority' indicate the Liberal's status in relation to the rest of the House. For example: If the House attendance was split 50-50 between the Liberals and the (entire) Opposition, 'Stalemate' was indicated. If the Liberals held more than half of the voting seats upon division 'Majority' would be indicated, and so forth. The numbers in brackets are representative of the number of Liberal members present and voting above or below the mean House attendance. For example: If the House attendance were 100 for a specific issue and the Liberals controlled 51 voting seats upon division, 'Majority(1)' would be catalogued in its appropriate position, 6) Party initiating the motion.

It should be noted that 23 of these divisions are marked with a triangle (Δ). These have been catagorized in Chapter 3 of the text as being 'crucial'. These divisions include those where (a) because of their importance, would have threatened the government's life and (b) the Liberals had a minority of members present and voting.

Motion Number	Date 1963	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
1	May 2	Nuclear Acquisition	Ideological	Stalemate (0)	NDP
Δ 2	May 21	(Budget) Amendment	Non-confidence	Minority (-1)	P.C.
3	Jun 5	Nuclear Acquisition	Ideological	Majority (1)	NDP
		(Note: Liberals accept NDP Motion)			
4	Jun 24	Budget Amendment	Non-confidence	Majority (10)	PC
5	Jun 26	Budget	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (8)	Lib.
6	Jul 2	Budget Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (7)	PC
7	Aug 2	(Rules to) Establish the Economic Council	Other	Majority (7)	PC
8	Oct 11	Maritime Transport	Regional Question	Minority (-4)	Lib.
Δ 9	Oct 15	Lack of Gov't Action in Agriculture	Non-confidence	Minority (-6)	SC
10	Oct 15	Help Eastern Agriculture	Regional Question	Minority (-4)	PC
Δ 11	Oct 22	Labor Relations (gov't of indecision)	Non-confidence	Minority (-2)	PC

Motion Number	Date 1963	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
12	Oct 29	Store Nuclear Arms in Quebec	Regional Question	Minority (-2)	SC
13	Oct 29	Abandon Defence Amendment	Ideological	Minority (-4)	PC
Δ 14	Oct 30	Reform Tax Act go to Committee	Monetary Amendment	Minority (-5)	PC
15	Nov 5	Need for Action on Unemployment	Question of National Economy	Majority (+4)	NDP
Δ 16	Nov 12	Co-op Federalisms rather than condemn Government (Note: Liberals accept NDP motion)	Non-confidence	Minority (-1)	NDP
Δ 17	Nov 13	Tax Act to Committee	Monetary Amendment	Minority (-2)	PC
Δ 18	Dec 12	Pension Act Amendment	Welfare	Minority (-3)	PC
	1964				
Δ 19	Feb 21	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-1)	NDP
Δ 20	Feb 25	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-1)	PC
Δ 21	Feb 27	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-2)	SC
Δ 22	Feb 27	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-1)	PC
23	Mar 19	Non- confidence in Chair	Non-confidence	Majority (+8)	SC

Motion Number	Date 1964	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
Δ 24	Mar 20	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-4)	NDP
25	Apr 7	Continue Winter Works in Severe Climate	Question of National Economy	Minority (-2)	SC
26	Apr 21	Transfer Veterans Hospital to Prov.	Federalism	Stalemate (0)	PC
27	May 1	Non-confidence in min. of Transport	Non-confidence	Majority (+2)	PC
28	May 5	Prov. Development of Water Supply	Federalism	Minority (-1)	SC
29	May 5	Lack of National Policy Water & Resources	Non-confidence	Majority (+3)	PC
Δ 30	May 26	Gov't failure to take effective action	Non-confidence	Minority (-2)	PC
31	Jul 16	Student Loans Amdt.	Other	Minority (-9)	SC
32	Jul 20	Student Loans Bill	Other	Majority (+8)	Lib.
33	Jul 24	Student Loans Bill	Other	Minority (-1)	Lib.
34	Sep 1	Flag Debate Amendment to Amendment	Nationalism	Minority (-7)	PC

Motion Number	Date 1964	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
35	Sep 3	Flag Debate (Maple Leaf Design)	Nationalism	Majority (+1)	NDP
36	Nov 18	Pension Plan	Welfare	Majority (+4)	Lib.
37	Dec 3	Adjourn Flag Committee Report	Nationalism	Majority (+16)	PC
38	Dec 8	National Flag Adjourn Debate	Nationalism	Majority (+3)	PC
Δ 39	Dec 10	Admt. to Flag Motion	Nationalism	Minority (-3)	PC
40	Dec 14	Flag Debate Motion for Closure	Nationalism	Majority (+3)	Lib.
41	Dec 14	Flag Committee Admt.	Nationalism	Majority (+2)	PC
42	Dec 14	Flag Committee Motion for Concurrence	Nationalism	Majority (+9)	Lib.
43	Dec 17	Flag Admt. to 7th Committee Report	Nationalism	Majority (+5)	PC
44	Dec 17	Admt. to Flag Report Free Vote	Free Vote	Majority (+7)	SC
45	Dec 17	Flag Debate (Union Jack option)	Nationalism	Majority (+9)	Lib.

Motion Number	Date 1965	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
46	Mar 29	Old Age Pension	Welfare	Majority (+8)	Lib.
47	Mar 30	Establish Programs Bill	Question of National Economy	Minority (-4)	PC
Δ 48	Apr 7	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Minority (-3)	NDP
49	Apr 9	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Majority (+4)	PC
50	Apr 12	Address in Reply	Address in Reply	Majority (+2)	SC
51	Apr 29	Ways and Means Admt.	Monetary Admt.	Majority (+4)	NDP
Δ 52	May 3	Budget Admt.	Monetary Admt.	Minority (-3)	PC
53	May 5	Budget	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+1)	Lib.
54	May 11	US-Can. Auto Pact	Ideological	Majority (+2)	NDP
55	May 17	Senate Retirement Bill Admt.	Other	Minority (-1)	NDP
56	May 18	Senate Retirement Bill Admt.	Other	Majority (+3)	PC
57	Jun 11	Shortening Debate Time	Other	Majority (+6)	Lib.
58	Jun 11	Income Tax Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+5)	Lib.
59	Jun 28	Income Tax Admt.	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+8)	NDP

27th PARLIAMENT: JANUARY 1966 - APRIL 1968

Motion Number	Date 1966	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
Δ 1	Jan 21	Spy Case	Non-confidence	Minority (-1)	NDP
Δ 2	Jan 25	Reply Throne Speech	Address in Reply	Minority (-1)	PC
3	Mar 22	Consumer Protection	Ideological	Majority (+2)	NDP
4	Mar 22	Consumer Protection	Ideological	Majority (+3)	PC
5	Apr 4	Abolish Capital Punishment	Free Vote	Minority (-1)	SC
6	Apr 5	5 year trial - Capital Punishment	Free Vote	Minority (-4)	Lib.
7	Apr 21	Budget Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+1)	PC
8	Apr 23	Repeal Power TO Commute Death Sentence	Free Vote	Minority (-3)	Lib.
Δ 9	May 3	Munsinger-Deplore Gov'ts use of RCMP	Non-confidence	Minority (-4)	PC
10	Jul 14	St. Lawrence Ports Bill	Regional Question	Majority (+9)	Lib.
11	Aug 31	Resume Employment in Railway	Question of National Economy	Majority (+3)	Lib.
12	Oct 6	Bond Act	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+2)	Lib.
13	Oct 20	Medicare-Provincial Jurisdiction	Federalism	Majority (+1)	PC

Motion Number	Date 1966	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
14	Oct 20	Medicare-Provinces Drop-out if desired	Ideological	Majority (+8)	PC
15	Oct 25	Medicare Bill	Ideological	Majority (+1)	Lib.
16	Nov 2	Armed Forces Represent Confederation	Nationalism	Majority (+1)	PC
17	Nov 22	Supply Bill Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+3)	NDP
18	Dec 8	Medicare	Ideological	Majority (+12)	Lib.
19	Dec 20	Old Age Family Allowance	Welfare	Majority (+16)	Lib.
	1967				
20	Jan 27	Transportation Bill	Other	Majority (+4)	Lib.
21	Feb 2	Can Forces Reorganization Amendment	Nationalism	Minority (-4)	PC
22	Feb 2	Can Forces Reorganization Bill	Nationalism	Minority (-2)	Lib.
23	Feb 9	Budget Supplement	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+6)	Pc
24	Feb 16	Excise Tax & Old Age Security Amendment	Welfare	Majority (+4)	Lib.
Δ 25	Feb 23	Income Tax Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Minority (-1)	Lib.

Motion Number	Date 1967	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
26	Mar 1	Immagration Appeal Board	Other	Minority (-3)	NDP
Δ 27	Mar 2	Excise Tax & Old Age Security Amendment	Welfare	Minority (-7)	NDP
28	Mar 2	Excise Tax & Old Age Security Amendment	Welfare	Majority (+1)	Lib.
29	Mar 15	Income Tax Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+3)	Lib.
30	Mar 21	Bank Bill Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+16)	NDP
31	Mar 21	Bank Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+19)	Lib.
32	Apr 20	National Defense Bill	Nationalism	Majority (+4)	Lib.
33	Apr 25	Time allotted to 3rd reading National Defense	Other	Minority (-1)	Lib.
34	May 17	Amendment to BNA Formula	Other	Majority (+7)	PC
35	Oct 3	Housing Crisis	Question of National Economy	Majority (+5)	PC
36	Oct 5	Budget Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+10)	NDP
37	Oct 10	Budget Amendment	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+6)	PC
38	Nov 8	Broadcasting Bill Question of Nationalization	Ideological	Stalemate (0)	PC
39	Nov 15	Capital Punishment Adjourn Debate	Free Vote	Minority (-2)	SC

Motion Number	Date 1967	Issue	Category	Attendance Status	Party Moving
40	Nov 16	Capital Punishment	Free Vote	Minority (-7)	PC
41	Nov 21	Nationalization of Industry	Ideological	Majority (+3)	NDP
42	Nov 21	Questioning National Economy	National Economy	Majority (+4)	PC
43	Nov 23	Death Sentence-Police Exemption	FREE Vote	Minority (-20	Lib.
44	Nov 30	Death Sentence	Free Vote	Minority (-12)	PC
45	Nov 30	Death Sentence	Free Vote	Minority (-6)	PC
46	Nov 30	Death Sentence	Free Vote	Minority (-14)	Lib.
47	Dec 7	Budget Supplement	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+5)	NDP
48	Dec 11	Budget Supplement	Monetary Amendment	Majority (+7)	PC
49	Feb 6	Income Tax Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+5)	Lib.
Δ 50	Feb 7	Income Tax Bill - to Committee	Gov't Money Bill	Minority (-5)	Lib.
Δ 51	Feb 19	Income Tax Bill	Gov't Money Bill	Minority (-2)	Lib
52	Feb 28	Non-Confidence	Non-confidence	Majority (+1)	Lib.
53	Mar 13	Banking Act	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+1)	Lib.
54	Mar 15	Tax Act	Gov't Money Bill	Majority (+4)	Lib.